Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics

Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics / edited by Reinhard Selten.

There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not...

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Bibliographic Details
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Other Authors: Selten, Reinhard (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 1991.
Edition:1st ed. 1991.
Series:Springer eBook Collection.
Subjects:
Probabilities.
Evolutionary biology.
Economic theory.
Biomathematics.
Statistics .
Electronic resources (E-books)
Online Access:Click to view e-book
Holy Cross Note:Loaded electronically.
Electronic access restricted to members of the Holy Cross Community.
Table of Contents:
  • to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”
  • to Volume I: “Evolution and Game Dynamics”
  • Game Theory and Population Dynamics in Complex Genetical Systems: The Role of Sex in Short Term and in Long Term Evolution
  • Evolutionary Stability and Dynamic Stability in a Class of Evolutionary Normal Form Games
  • Anticipatory Learning in Two-Person Games
  • The Origin of Isogamous Sexual Differentiation
  • The Evolutionary Stability of Bluffing in a Class of Extensive Form Games
  • Pollinator Foraging and Flower Competition in a Game Equilibrium Model
  • To Trade, or Not to Trade; That Is the Question
  • Competition Avoidance in a Dragonfly Mating System
  • On the Evolution of Group-Based Altruism.

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