Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union by Guido S. Merzoni.

Strategic delegation is a widespread phenomenon in economic and social systems. In many situations the main interested party benefits from appointing a delegate to take action that the principal - were he playing - could not credibly take. This book contributes to the literature studying such a phen...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Merzoni, Guido S. (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Heidelberg : Physica-Verlag HD : Imprint: Physica, 2003.
Edition:1st ed. 2003.
Series:Contributions to Economics,
Springer eBook Collection.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click to view e-book
Holy Cross Note:Loaded electronically.
Electronic access restricted to members of the Holy Cross Community.

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505 0 |a 1 - Introduction -- 2 - Strategic delegation in firms competing underincomplete information -- 2.1 Strategic competition and the firm’s organisational design -- 2.2 A model of strategic delegation in duopoly with incomplete information -- 2.3 Equilibrium output and effort provision with strategic delegation -- 2.4 The effort provision under alternative settings -- 2.5 The case of linear demand -- 2.6 Conclusions -- Appendix 2.1. Proofs of Proposition 2.3 and of Lemma 2.6 -- 3 - Delegation contracts’ observability and collusion -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Observability in delegation games -- 3.3 The benchmark model -- 3.4 Non-renegotiable contracts -- 3.5 One round of renegotiation -- 3.6 Delayed observability and renegotiation costs -- 3.7 Conclusions -- Appendix 3.1 - Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and of Corollary 3.7 -- Appendix 3.2 - The computation of a collusive equilibrium -- 4 - Strategic delegation in the trade union -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The nature of the trade union: co-ordination costs and the delegation of authority -- 4.3 A model of bargaining with threats -- 4.4 Direct bargaining -- 4.5 Strategically delegated bargaining -- 4.6 Conclusions -- 5 - Competition for delegates and the evolution of market structure -- 5.1 New managers, technological innovation and industry evolution -- 5.2 A model of dynamic competition for managers -- 5.3 Catching-Up -- 5.4 Increasing Dominance -- 5.5 Market structure and returns to managers -- 5.6 Market size and product differentiation with DRM -- 5.7 Some welfare implications -- 5.8 Conclusions -- Appendix 5.1 - Programs for the simulations -- 6 - Conclusions -- References -- Declaration -- List of figures -- List of tables. 
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