Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union

Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union by Guido S. Merzoni.

Strategic delegation is a widespread phenomenon in economic and social systems. In many situations the main interested party benefits from appointing a delegate to take action that the principal - were he playing - could not credibly take. This book contributes to the literature studying such a phen...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Merzoni, Guido S. (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Heidelberg : Physica-Verlag HD : Imprint: Physica, 2003.
Edition:1st ed. 2003.
Series:Contributions to Economics,
Springer eBook Collection.
Subjects:
Industrial organization.
Economic theory.
Electronic resources (E-books)
Online Access:Click to view e-book
Holy Cross Note:Loaded electronically.
Electronic access restricted to members of the Holy Cross Community.
Table of Contents:
  • 1 - Introduction
  • 2 - Strategic delegation in firms competing underincomplete information
  • 2.1 Strategic competition and the firm’s organisational design
  • 2.2 A model of strategic delegation in duopoly with incomplete information
  • 2.3 Equilibrium output and effort provision with strategic delegation
  • 2.4 The effort provision under alternative settings
  • 2.5 The case of linear demand
  • 2.6 Conclusions
  • Appendix 2.1. Proofs of Proposition 2.3 and of Lemma 2.6
  • 3 - Delegation contracts’ observability and collusion
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Observability in delegation games
  • 3.3 The benchmark model
  • 3.4 Non-renegotiable contracts
  • 3.5 One round of renegotiation
  • 3.6 Delayed observability and renegotiation costs
  • 3.7 Conclusions
  • Appendix 3.1 - Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and of Corollary 3.7
  • Appendix 3.2 - The computation of a collusive equilibrium
  • 4 - Strategic delegation in the trade union
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 The nature of the trade union: co-ordination costs and the delegation of authority
  • 4.3 A model of bargaining with threats
  • 4.4 Direct bargaining
  • 4.5 Strategically delegated bargaining
  • 4.6 Conclusions
  • 5 - Competition for delegates and the evolution of market structure
  • 5.1 New managers, technological innovation and industry evolution
  • 5.2 A model of dynamic competition for managers
  • 5.3 Catching-Up
  • 5.4 Increasing Dominance
  • 5.5 Market structure and returns to managers
  • 5.6 Market size and product differentiation with DRM
  • 5.7 Some welfare implications
  • 5.8 Conclusions
  • Appendix 5.1 - Programs for the simulations
  • 6 - Conclusions
  • References
  • Declaration
  • List of figures
  • List of tables.

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