The Invisible Origins of Legal Positivism A Re-Reading of a Tradition

The Invisible Origins of Legal Positivism A Re-Reading of a Tradition / by W.E. Conklin.

Conklin's thesis is that the tradition of modern legal positivism, beginning with Thomas Hobbes, postulated different senses of the invisible as the authorising origin of humanly posited laws. Conklin re-reads the tradition by privileging how the canons share a particular understanding of legal...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Conklin, W.E (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 2001.
Edition:1st ed. 2001.
Series:Law and Philosophy Library, 52
Springer eBook Collection.
Subjects:
Political science.
Ethics.
Law—Philosophy.
Law.
Political philosophy.
Constitutional law.
Electronic resources (E-books)
Online Access:Click to view e-book
Holy Cross Note:Loaded electronically.
Electronic access restricted to members of the Holy Cross Community.
Table of Contents:
  • One: The Positive Law/Natural Law Dichotomy, Aristotle and the Greek Totemic Culture
  • 1. The Rise of the Positive Law – Natural Law Dichotomy
  • 2. The Constraint of the Positive Law – Natural Law Dichotomy
  • 3. The Determinative Sense of Natural Laws
  • 4. The Exclusionary Character of the Nomos/Physis Dichotomy
  • 5. The Figurative Sense of Natural Laws
  • 6. The Laws of the Totemic Culture
  • 7. The Positive Law – Natural Law Dichotomy as Suspect
  • Two: Invisibility in Modern Legal Thought
  • 1. The Invisible Author
  • 2. The Invisible as an Inaccessible Immediacy
  • 3. The Invisible as an a priori Concept
  • 4. The Invisibility of the Absent Origin
  • Three: The Tradition of Legal Positivism in Modern Legal Thought
  • 1. The Impersonality of Posited Laws
  • 2. Is there a Tradition of Legal Positivism?
  • 3. Three Inquiries
  • 4. The Authorizing Origin of Posited Rules/Norms
  • 5. The Problematic of Modem Legal Positivism
  • Four: An Invisible Nature: The Origin of Thomas Hobbes’s Civil Laws
  • 1. The Parado
  • 2. Why is Language Important?
  • 3. Nature as a Condition lacking a Shared Language
  • 4. The Actors of a Language
  • 5. The Problematic of Hobbes’ Theory of Sovereignty
  • 6. The Natural Condition
  • 7. The Authority of Written Laws
  • 8. Legal Obligation
  • 9. The Mythology of Legal Authority
  • 10. The Invisible Origin of the Authority of Hobbes’ Civil Laws
  • 11. The Forgotten Origin
  • Five: Naming the Unnamable: Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s General Will
  • 1. The Author as the General Will
  • 2. The Legislature
  • 3. Civil Laws as the Expression of the general will
  • 4. Naming the Unnamable
  • Six: The Habits of the People: The Origin of John Austin’s Laws Properly So Called
  • 1. The Problematic of Austin’s Theory of Law
  • 2. Austin’s Commentators
  • 3. The Excise of the Natural Condition from Civil Society
  • 4. The Historical Author
  • 5. Is the Historical Author’s Authority Unlimited?
  • 6. The Inaccessibility of the Will of the People
  • 7. Austin’s Inaccessible Arche
  • 8. Who are ̀the People’?
  • 9. The Spirit of ̀the People’
  • Seven: The Invisible Origin of Legal Language: The Grundnorm
  • 1. The Impure Origin of the Structure
  • 2. An Hypothetical or a Catogorical Origin?
  • 3. The Origin as an a priori Concept
  • 4. The Invisible Origin of the Authority of Norms
  • IChapter Eight: The Forgotten Origin: H.L.A. Hart’s Sense of the Pre-Legal
  • 1. The Rule of Recognition
  • 2. The Immediacy and the Statement
  • 3. Examples of Hart’s Distinction between Immediacy and Legal Statements
  • 4. Does the Authorizing Origin Pre-exist Primary Rules?
  • 5. Is the Authorizing Origin Internal to the Primary and Secondary Rules?
  • 6. Is the Authorizing Origin Accessible to Legal Officials?
  • 7. The Forgotten Origin
  • Nine: Forgetting the Act of Forgetting: Raz’s Inaccessible Origin of Legal Reasoning
  • 1. Experiential Bonding as the Origin of the Legal Structure
  • 2. The Official’s Forgetting of the Experiential Origin
  • 3. The Legal Point of View
  • 4. The Unwritten Experiential Beliefs
  • 5. The Language of the Legal Point of View
  • 6. Violence and the Constitution of the Institutions
  • 7. The Idealism of Raz’s Legal Reasoning
  • 8. Forgetting the Act of Forgetting
  • Conclusion: The End of Legal Positivism
  • 1. The Finality of the Trace of Auctoritas
  • 2. The Invisible Origin
  • 3. The Violence of the Juridical Production of the Origin
  • 4. The Contradiction
  • 5. Forgetting the Origin
  • 6. The Crisis
  • 7. The End of a Tradition
  • 1. Primary Sources
  • 2. Secondary Sources.

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