Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules

Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules / by William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley.

The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters’ preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange el...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Gehrlein, William V. (Author), Lepelley, Dominique (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2011.
Edition:1st ed. 2011.
Series:Studies in Choice and Welfare,
Springer eBook Collection.
Subjects:
Economic theory.
Political economy.
Public finance.
Political science.
Game theory.
Electronic resources (E-books)
Online Access:Click to view e-book
Holy Cross Note:Loaded electronically.
Electronic access restricted to members of the Holy Cross Community.
Table of Contents:
  • Voting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities
  • Condorcet's Paradox and Group Coherence
  • Other Incompability Paradoxes
  • Other Voting Paradoxes
  • Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity
  • Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis
  • Other Characteristics of Voting Rules
  • The Significance of Voting Rule Selection
  • Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies.

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