Mind in a physical world : an essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation / Jaegwon Kim.
"This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind - in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding...
Cambridge, Mass. :
|Series:||Representation and mind.
|Online Access:||Click for online access|
- Chapter 1
- The Mind-Body Problem: Where We Now Are
- Supervenience, Realization, and Emergence
- Supervenience Is Not a Mind-Body Theory
- The Layered Model and Mereological Supervenience
- Physical Realizationism
- Physical Realizationism Explains Mind-Body Supervenience
- Chapter 2
- The Many Problems of Mental Causation
- Three Problems of Mental Causation
- The Supervenience Argument, or Descartes's Revenge
- Searle, Fodor, and the Supervenience Argument
- Block's Worries about Second-Order Properties
- Chapter 3
- Mental Causation: The Backlash and Free Lunches
- Unavoidability of Metaphysics: The Exclusion Problem
- Do Counterfactuals Help?
- "Program Explanation" and Supervenient Causation
- Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize?
- Properties: "Levels" and "Orders"
- Chapter 4
- Reduction and Reductionism: A New Look
- Nagel Reduction: Troubles with 'Bridge Laws'
- The Functional Model of Reduction
- Functional Properties versus Functional Concepts
- Multiple Realization Again
- The Supervenience Argument Revisited
- The Options: Good News and Bad News