Perfect deterrence / Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour.

An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Zagare, Frank C.
Other Authors: Kilgour, D. Marc
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, ©2000.
Series:Cambridge studies in international relations ; 72.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Classical deterrence theory
  • Rationality and deterrence
  • Credibility and deterrence
  • Uncertainty and mutual deterrence
  • Unilateral deterrence
  • Modeling extended deterrence
  • Modeling massive retaliation
  • Modeling flexible response
  • Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence
  • Perfect deterrence theory.