Naturalistic realism and the antirealist challenge / Drew Khlentzos.

In this important book, Drew Khlentzos explains the antirealist argument from a realist perspective. He defends naturalistic realism against the antirealist challenge, and he considers the consequences of his defense for our understanding of realism and truth. Khlentzos argues that the naturalistic...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Khlentzos, Drew
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2004.
Series:Representation and mind.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access

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100 1 |a Khlentzos, Drew. 
245 1 0 |a Naturalistic realism and the antirealist challenge /  |c Drew Khlentzos. 
260 |a Cambridge, Mass. :  |b MIT Press,  |c ©2004. 
300 |a 1 online resource (viii, 408 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
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490 1 |a Representation and mind 
500 |a "A Bradford book." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 391-399) and index. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
520 |a In this important book, Drew Khlentzos explains the antirealist argument from a realist perspective. He defends naturalistic realism against the antirealist challenge, and he considers the consequences of his defense for our understanding of realism and truth. Khlentzos argues that the naturalistic realist view that the world exists independently of the mind must take into consideration what he calls the representation problem: if the naturalistic realist view is true, how can mental representation of the world be explained? He examines this major antirealist challenge in detail and shows that many realists have dismissed it because they have not understood its nature. He sees it as a philosophical puzzle: the antirealist challenge, if sound, does not prove that there are no objects that exist independently of the mind, but that there is no rational basis for thinking that there are; we have good reason to believe in the naturalistic view, but (given the antirealist arguments) we have no way of knowing how it could be true. Khlentzos surveys the antirealist arguments of Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, and Crispin Wright and suggests a realist answer. He argues for a radically nonepistemic conception of truth, and against pragmatist, intuitionist, verificationist, and pluralist alternatives. He examines and rejects some current versions of physicalism and functionalism, and offers an original version of the correspondence theory of truth. 
546 |a English. 
505 0 0 |t Introduction : naturalistic realism and antirealism --  |g I.  |t Metaphysical realism and truth --  |g 1.  |t Contesting realism --  |g II.  |t Dummett's antirealism --  |g 2.  |t The antirealist arguments --  |g 3.  |t Realist replies to antirealism --  |g 4.  |t Intuitionistic foundations of antirealism --  |g III.  |t Putnam's internalism --  |g 5.  |t The internalist critique of realism --  |g 6.  |t Models, representation, and reality --  |g 7.  |t Internalism, pluralism, and antirepresentationalism --  |g IV.  |t Prospects for naturalistic realism --  |g 8.  |t Realism, facts, and truth. 
650 0 |a Realism. 
650 0 |a Naturalism. 
650 7 |a naturalism (philosophical movement)  |2 aat 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Movements  |x Realism.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Naturalism  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Realism  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Naturalismus  |2 gnd 
650 7 |a Realismus  |2 gnd 
650 1 7 |a Realisme (filosofie)  |2 gtt 
650 1 7 |a Antirealisme (filosofie)  |2 gtt 
650 7 |a Realism.  |2 nli 
650 7 |a Naturalism.  |2 nli 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Khlentzos, Drew.  |t Naturalistic realism and the antirealist challenge.  |d Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2004  |z 026211285X  |w (DLC) 2003059679  |w (OCoLC)52706333 
830 0 |a Representation and mind. 
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