Natural minds / Thomas W. Polger.

In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain--that sensations are brain processes--and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advoca...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Polger, Thomas W.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2004.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a22000004a 4500
001 ocm57141809
003 OCoLC
005 20240402213017.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu|||unuuu
008 041203s2004 maua ob 001 0 eng d
010 |a  2003048826 
040 |a N$T  |b eng  |e pn  |c N$T  |d OCLCQ  |d YDXCP  |d OCLCQ  |d N$T  |d OCLCQ  |d TUU  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCF  |d NLGGC  |d OCLCQ  |d AGLDB  |d OCLCQ  |d WY@  |d LUE  |d WRM  |d VTS  |d OCLCQ  |d REC  |d MITPR  |d STF  |d G3B  |d AU@  |d K6U  |d SFB  |d EBLCP  |d UKSSU  |d LDP  |d UKAHL  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO 
015 |a GBA530438  |2 bnb 
016 7 |a 000024611533  |2 AU 
019 |a 991955304  |a 1038634742  |a 1058007235  |a 1125359163  |a 1136435159  |a 1154846315  |a 1156929254  |a 1162524746  |a 1163023964  |a 1171910378 
020 |a 9780262281737  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 0262281732  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 1417560738  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 9781417560738  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 0262162210  |q (alk. paper) 
020 |a 9780262162210 
020 |a 0262661969  |q (pbk.) 
020 |a 9780262661966 
024 3 |a 9780262162210 
035 |a (OCoLC)57141809  |z (OCoLC)991955304  |z (OCoLC)1038634742  |z (OCoLC)1058007235  |z (OCoLC)1125359163  |z (OCoLC)1136435159  |z (OCoLC)1154846315  |z (OCoLC)1156929254  |z (OCoLC)1162524746  |z (OCoLC)1163023964  |z (OCoLC)1171910378 
037 |a 4863  |b MIT Press 
037 |a 9780262281737  |b MIT Press 
050 4 |a B105.M55  |b P65 2004eb 
072 7 |a PHI  |x 015000  |2 bisacsh 
049 |a HCDD 
100 1 |a Polger, Thomas W. 
245 1 0 |a Natural minds /  |c Thomas W. Polger. 
260 |a Cambridge, Mass. :  |b MIT Press,  |c ©2004. 
300 |a 1 online resource (xxvii, 294 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
500 |a "A Bradford book." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 271-287) and index. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
520 |a In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain--that sensations are brain processes--and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties--a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily identical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's approach to what William James called the "great blooming buzzing confusion" of consciousness begins with the idea that we need to know more about brains in order to understand consciousness fully, but recognizes that biology alone cannot provide the entire explanation. Natural Minds takes on issues from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and metaphysics, moving freely among them in its discussion. Polger begins by answering two major objections to identity theory--Hilary Putnam's argument from multiple realizability (which discounts identity theory because creatures with brains unlike ours could also have mental states) and Saul Kripke's modal argument against mind-brain identity (based on the apparent contingency of the identity statement). He then offers a detailed account of functionalism and functional realization, which offer the most serious obstacle to consideration of identity theory. Polger argues that identity theory can itself satisfy the kind of explanatory demands that are often believed to favor functionalism 
505 0 |a 1. Minds, Brains, and Multiple Realizability -- 2. The Illusion of Contingent Identity -- 3. Varieties of Functionalism -- 4. Realization and Generic Functionalism -- 5. Functional Realizations -- 6. Functional Properties and Mechanistic Explanations -- 7. Dennett's Challenge -- 8. Minds, Brains, and Persons. 
546 |a English. 
650 0 |a Mind-brain identity theory. 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Mind & Body.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Mind-brain identity theory  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Philosophy.  |2 hilcc 
650 7 |a Philosophy & Religion.  |2 hilcc 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Polger, Thomas W.  |t Natural minds.  |d Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2004  |z 0262162210  |w (DLC) 2003048826  |w (OCoLC)52134673 
856 4 0 |u https://holycross.idm.oclc.org/login?auth=cas&url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4863.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy  |y Click for online access 
903 |a MIT-D2O-Backfile-Complete 
994 |a 92  |b HCD