Antitrust law : economic theory and common law evolution

Antitrust law : economic theory and common law evolution / Keith N. Hylton.

This book is an effort to consolidate several different perspectives on antitrust law. Specific topics covered include perfect competition versus monopoly, enforcement, cartels, section 1 doctrine, rule of reason, agreement, boycott, power, vertical restraints, tying and exclusive dealing, horizonta...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hylton, Keith N.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Subjects:
Antitrust law > United States.
Antitrust law > Economic aspects.
LAW > Taxation.
Antitrust law
Antitrust law > Economic aspects
Antitrustrecht
Antitrustwetgeving.
Economische aspecten.
Common law.
United States
USA
Electronic books.
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Economics. Definitions ; Perfect competition versus monopoly ; Further topics
  • Law and policy. Some interpretations issues ; Enacting the antitrust law ; What should antitrust law aim to do?
  • Enforcement. Optimal enforcement theory ; Enforcement provision of the antitrust laws ; Appendix
  • Cartels. Cartels ; Conscious parallelism ; Conclusion
  • Development of Section 1 doctrine. The Sherman Act versus the common law ; Rule of reason and per-se rule ; Conclusion
  • Rule of reason and per-se rule. The case for price-fixing ; Per-se and rule of reason analysis: further developments ; Per-se versus rule of reason tests: understanding the Supreme Court's justification for the per-se rule
  • Agreement. The development of inference doctrine ; Rejection of unilateral contract theory
  • Facilitating mechanisms. Data dissemination cases ; Basing point pricing and related practices ; Basing point pricing: economics
  • Boycotts. Pre-Socony ; Post-Socony ; Post-BMI/Sylvania ; Conclusion
  • Monopolization. Development of Section 2 doctrine ; Leveraging and essential facility cases ; Predatory pricing ; Conclusion
  • Power. Measuring market power ; Determinants of market power ; Substitutability and the relevant market: cellophane ; Multi-market monopoly and the relevant market: Alcoa ; Measuring power: guidelines
  • Attempts. The Swift formula and modern doctrine ; Dangerous probability requirement
  • Vertical restraints. Resale price maintenance ; Vertical nonprice restraints ; Manufacturer retains title ; Agreement
  • Tying and exclusive dealing. Introduction ; Early cases ; Development of the per-se rule ; Tension between rule of reason arguments and per-se rule ; Technological tying ; Exclusive dealing ; Appendix
  • Horizontal Mergers. Reasons for merging and implications for law ; Horizontal merger law ; Conclusion ; Appendix
  • Mergers, vertical and conglomerate. Vertical mergers ; Conglomerate mergers ; Concluding remarks
  • Antitrust and the state. Noerr-Pennington doctrine ; Parker doctrine ; Some final comments: error costs and immunity doctrines.

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