Consciousness, color, and content / Michael Tye.

Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Tye, Michael.
Format: Electronic
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2000.
©2000
Series:Representation and mind.
Bradford book.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access
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245 1 0 |a Consciousness, color, and content /  |c Michael Tye. 
260 |a Cambridge, Mass. :  |b MIT Press,  |c 2000. 
264 4 |c ©2000 
300 |a 1 online resource (xiii, 198 pages) 
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490 1 |a Representation and mind 
500 |a "A Bradford book." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 187-192) and indexes. 
505 0 0 |g 1.  |t Knowing what it is like : the ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument --  |g 2.  |t The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion --  |g 3.  |t Representationalism : the theory and its motivations --  |g 4.  |t Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities : new problems for representationalism? --  |g 5.  |t On moderation in matters phenomenal : shoemaker and inverted qualia --  |g 6.  |t Swampman meets inverted earth --  |g 7.  |t On some alleged problems for objectivism about color --  |g 8.  |t The problem of simple minds : is there anything it is like to be a honey bee? 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
520 8 |a Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive matter, something more widespread in nature than higher-order or reflective consciousness, it is deeply puzzling. In 1995 Michael Tye proposed a theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. Tye's focus is broader than representationalism, however. Two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In part I of this book, Tye suggests that these challenges are intimately related. The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. Part II of the book is devoted to representationalism. Part III connects representationalism with two more general issues. The first is the nature of color. Tye defends a commonsense, objectivist view of color and argues that such a view is compatible with modern color science. In the final chapter, Tye addresses the question of where on the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases, arguing that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such relatively simple creatures as the honeybee 
546 |a English. 
650 0 |a Consciousness. 
650 0 |a Color (Philosophy) 
650 0 |a Mental representation. 
650 7 |a PSYCHOLOGY  |x Personality.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Mind & Body.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Color (Philosophy)  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00868527 
650 7 |a Consciousness.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00875441 
650 7 |a Mental representation.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01016620 
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650 1 7 |a Filosofie van de geest.  |2 gtt 
650 1 7 |a Bewustzijn.  |2 gtt 
650 1 7 |a Mentale representatie.  |2 gtt 
650 1 7 |a Kleurwaarneming.  |2 gtt 
650 7 |a CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO)  |2 larpcal 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Tye, Michael.  |t Consciousness, color, and content.  |d Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2000  |z 0262201291  |w (DLC) 99089688  |w (OCoLC)43207297 
830 0 |a Representation and mind. 
830 0 |a Bradford book. 
856 4 0 |u https://holycross.idm.oclc.org/login?auth=cas&url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2110.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy  |y Click for online access 
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