Consciousness, color, and content / Michael Tye.
Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive...
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Main Author: | Tye, Michael. |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
2000.
©2000 |
Series: | Representation and mind.
Bradford book. |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Click for online access |
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