Consciousness, color, and content / Michael Tye.
Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
2000.
©2000 |
| Series: | Representation and mind.
Bradford book. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Click for online access |
Table of Contents:
- 1. Knowing what it is like : the ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument
- 2. The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion
- 3. Representationalism : the theory and its motivations
- 4. Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities : new problems for representationalism?
- 5. On moderation in matters phenomenal : shoemaker and inverted qualia
- 6. Swampman meets inverted earth
- 7. On some alleged problems for objectivism about color
- 8. The problem of simple minds : is there anything it is like to be a honey bee?