Rational herds : economic models of social learning

Rational herds : economic models of social learning / Christophe P. Chamley.

This book is the first in the exciting new field of social learning.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Chamley, Christophe
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, ©2004.
Subjects:
Social learning.
Social learning > Mathematical models.
Decision making.
Collective behavior.
decision making.
SOCIAL SCIENCE > General.
Collective behavior
Decision making
Social learning
Soziales Lernen
Kollektives Verhalten
Mathematisches Modell
Sociaal leren.
Wiskundige modellen.
Aprendizagem social.
Aprendizagem social (modelos matemáticos)
Tomada de decisão.
Comportamento coletivo.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • 1. Introduction
  • Part I. Social learning : 2. Bayesian tools : The bayesian framework ; Binary and Gaussian information ; Private signals and beliefs ; Martingales
  • 3. Social learning with a common memory : A canonical model of social learning ; Efficient learning ; Observation noise ; Extensions
  • 4. Cascades and herds : The basic model of herding ; The standard model with bounded beliefs ; The convergence of beliefs ; Herds and the slow convergence of beliefs ; Pricing the informational externality ; Crashes and booms
  • 5. Limited memories : The sequential model with sampling ; The welfare-improving principle ; Sampling in a very large population ; Social learning or sampling in a large population?
  • 6. Delays : The simplest model ; A general model with heterogeneous beliefs ; Properties
  • 7. More delays : The length of a period ; Continuous times ; Buildup of private information ; Observation of payoffs
  • 8. Outcomes : Incomplete learning ; The determinant of economic success: luck or effort? ; Complete learning with a diversity of private beliefs
  • 9. Networks and diffusion : Optimization and diffusion of innovations ; Learning in networks
  • 10. Words : Advice by one expert ; Larger sets of states and messages ; Panel of experts ; The receiver does not make the evaluation
  • Part II. Coordination : 11. Guessing to coordinate : Overview ; Eductive stability in a standard market ; Strategic complementarities ; Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate
  • 12. Learning to coordinate : A distribution with a cluster ; Observation noise
  • 13. Delays and payoff externalities : Strategic substitutability ; Strategic complementaries
  • Part III. Financial herding : 14.l Sequences of financial trades : Learning in the model of Glosten and Milgrom ; Herds ; Avalanches ; Herding in auctions
  • 15. Gaussian financial markets : Actions in the CARA-Gauss model ; Markets ; The convergence of beliefs ; Multiple equilibria, crashes, and booms
  • 16. Financial frenzies : Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate ; Information delays in financial markets ; The crash of a bubble.

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