Moral skepticisms.

Addresses almost all contentious moral issues - from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action - which raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. The questions lead to fundamental issues about the nature of morality, language, metaphysics, justification, and knowledge.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 1955-
Corporate Author: Oxford University Press
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York : Oxford University Press, 2006.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • PART I: ISSUES
  • Chapter 1. What Is Moral Epistemology?
  • 1.1. Moral Theory
  • 1.2. Epistemology Applied to Morality
  • 1.3. Varieties of Moral Skepticism
  • 1.4. Presumptions Against Moral Skepticism
  • Chapter 2. Are Moral Beliefs Truth-Apt?
  • 2.1. Does Knowledge Require True Belief?
  • 2.2. Expressivism
  • Chapter 3. Are Any Moral Beliefs True?
  • 3.1. Error Theories
  • 3.2. Arguments Against Moral Facts
  • 3.3. Is Moral Nihilism Coherent?
  • 3.4. So Far
  • Chapter 4. Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?
  • 4.1. Does Knowledge Require Justified Belief?
  • 4.2. Ways to Be Justified
  • 4.3. Arguments Against Justified Moral Belief
  • Chapter 5. In Contrast with What?
  • 5.1. Contrast Classes in Epistemology
  • 5.2. Unqualified Epistemic Judgments
  • 5.3. Problems for Relevance
  • 5.4. Classy Pyrrhonism
  • 5.5. Objections
  • Chapter 6. Classy Moral Pyrrhonism
  • 6.1. Moral Contrast Classes
  • 6.2. Unqualified Judgments in Moral Epistemology
  • 6.3. Relativized Moral Skepticisms
  • 6.4. Academic Moral Skepticism
  • 6.5. Is Moral Nihilism Relevant?
  • 6.6. More Problems for Relevance
  • 6.7. Moderate Moral Pyrrhonism
  • PART II: THEORIES
  • Chapter 7. Naturalism
  • 7.1. The Original Humean Doctrine
  • 7.2. Necessary Moral Truths
  • 7.3. Logical Tricks
  • 7.4. Appeals to Authority
  • 7.5. Other Naturalisms
  • Chapter 8. Normativism
  • 8.1. Moral Explanations
  • 8.2. Contractarianism and Contractualism
  • Chapter 9. Intuitionism
  • 9.1. What Is Moral Intuitionism?
  • 9.2. Which Contrast Class?
  • 9.3. When Do Beliefs Need Confirmation?
  • 9.4. Do Moral Beliefs Need Confirmation?
  • 9.5. Objections
  • 9.6. Qualifications and Conclusions
  • Chapter 10. Coherentism
  • 10.1. What Is Coherence?
  • 10.2. First-Order Coherence
  • 10.3. Second-Order Coherence
  • 10.4. Wider Coherence
  • 10.5. Which Contrast Class?
  • 10.6. Objections.
  • 10.7. Conclusions
  • References
  • Index
  • A
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