Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts / Michael Tye.

We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more.

Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Tye, Michael
Μορφή: Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2009.
Σειρά:Representation and mind.
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Click for online access
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Περιγραφή
Περίληψη:We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more.
Περιγραφή τεκμηρίου:"A Bradford book."
Φυσική περιγραφή:1 online resource (xiv, 229 pages) : illustrations
Βιβλιογραφία:Includes bibliographical references (pages 217-225) and index.
ISBN:9780262255172
0262255170
9780262261227
0262261227
1282240137
9781282240131
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001