Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts / Michael Tye.

We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Tye, Michael.
Format: Electronic
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2009.
Series:Representation and mind.
Online Access:Click for online access
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Table of Contents:
  • Introduction
  • Phenomenal consciousness. Preliminary remarks
  • Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation
  • The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness
  • Consciousness of things
  • Real-world puzzle cases
  • Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be. What is the thesis of physicalism?
  • Why consciousness cannot be physical
  • Why consciousness must be physical
  • Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts. Some terminological points
  • Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts
  • Various accounts of phenomenal concepts
  • My earlier view on phenomenal concepts
  • Are there any phenomenal concepts?
  • Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions
  • Consequences for a priori physicalism
  • The admissible contents of visual experience. The existential thesis
  • The singular (when filled) thesis
  • Kaplanianism
  • The multiple-contents thesis
  • The existential thesis revisited
  • Still more on existential contents
  • Conclusion
  • Consciousness, seeing and knowing. Knowing things and knowing facts
  • Nonconceptual content
  • Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties
  • Phenomenal character and representational content, part I
  • Phenomenal character and representational content, part II
  • Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it
  • Solving the puzzles. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow?
  • The explanatory gap
  • The hard problem
  • The possibility of zombies
  • Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion. A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses
  • The "no-see-um" view
  • Sperling and the refrigerator light
  • Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility
  • A further change-blindness experiment
  • Another brick in the wall
  • Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism. The threat to privileged access
  • A Burgean thought experiment
  • Social externalism for phenomenal character?
  • A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility
  • How do I know that I am not a zombie?
  • Phenomenal externalism.