The case for contextualism.

It's an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we'll deny is "knowledge" in other (&q...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: DeRose, Keith, 1962-
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : OUP Oxford, 2009.
Series:DeRose, Keith, 1962- Knowledge, skepticism, and context ; v. 1.
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Online Access:Click for online access
Description
Summary:It's an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we'll deny is "knowledge" in other ("high-standards") contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varying standards for whenit is or would be true for them to attribute knowledge? Or are the standar.
Physical Description:1 online resource (303 pages)
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9780191569845
0191569844
Source of Description, Etc. Note:Print version record.