Rules, games, and common-pool resources

Rules, games, and common-pool resources / Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker ; with Arun Agrawal [and others].

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ostrom, Elinor (Author), Gardner, Roy, 1947- (Author), Walker, James, 1950- (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, ©1994.
Subjects:
Public goods.
Natural resources > Management.
Game theory.
Natürliche Ressourcen
Spieltheorie
Öffentliches Gut
Collectieve goederen.
Speltheorie.
Common property.
biens publics > théorie des jeux.
ressources naturelles > théorie des jeux.
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Ch. 1. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resource Problems
  • Ch. 2. Institutional Analysis and Common-Pool Resources
  • Ch. 3. Games Appropriators Play
  • Ch. 4. Rules and Games
  • Ch. 5. CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments
  • Ch. 6. Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR
  • Ch. 7. Communication in the Commons
  • Ch. 8. Sanctioning and Communication Institutions
  • Ch. 9. Regularities from the Laboratory and Possible Explanations
  • Ch. 10. Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems / Shui Yan Tang
  • Ch. 11. Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas / Edella Schlager
  • Ch. 12. Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use / Arun Agrawal
  • Ch. 13. Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California / William Blomquist
  • Ch. 14. Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations / William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang and Elinor Ostrom.
  • Ch. 15. Cooperation and Social Capital.

Similar Items