Description
| Summary: | An implication of the "globalization hazard" hypothesis is that sudden stops could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard by creating international moral hazard. We study this tradeoff using an equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without guarantees, margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by Fisher's debt-deflation process. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by propping up foreign asset demand, but their effectiveness and welfare implications depend critically on the price elasticity of foreign demand and on making the guarantees contingent on debt levels
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (33, [11] pages) : illustrations |
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| Format: | Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. |
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| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |
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| ISBN: | 128351818X
9781283518185
9781451908695
1451908695 |
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| Reproduction Note: | Electronic reproduction. |
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| Source of Description, Etc. Note: | Print version record. |
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| Action Note: | digitized |
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