Understanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex : abbreviated version / Committee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council of the National Academies.

A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It might have particular value if acquired from a U.S. facility--in addition to acquiring a highly destructive tool, the adversary would demonstrate an inability of...

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Bibliographic Details
Corporate Author: National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : National Academies Press, 2011.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access

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110 2 |a National Research Council (U.S.).  |b Committee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. 
245 1 0 |a Understanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex :  |b abbreviated version /  |c Committee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council of the National Academies. 
260 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b National Academies Press,  |c 2011. 
300 |a 1 online resource (xv, 13 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
347 |a data file  |2 rda 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (page 6). 
520 |a A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It might have particular value if acquired from a U.S. facility--in addition to acquiring a highly destructive tool, the adversary would demonstrate an inability of the United States to protect its nuclear assets. The United States expends considerable resources toward maintaining effective security at facilities that house its nuclear assets. However, particularly in a budget-constrained environment, it is essential that these assets are also secured efficiently, meaning at reasonable cost and imposing minimal burdens on the primary missions of the organizations that operate U.S. nuclear facilities. It is in this context that the U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a semi-autonomous agency in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for securing nuclear weapons and significant quantities of SNM--asked the National Academies for advice on augmenting its security approach, particularly on the applicability of quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing its facilities. In carrying out its charge, the committee has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its security approach more effective and efficient. The committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost, security, and operations at facilities in the nuclear weapons complex is not to assess security risks more quantitatively or more precisely. This is primarily because there is no comprehensive analytical basis for defining the attack strategies that a malicious, creative, and deliberate adversary might employ or the probabilities associated with them. However, using structured thinking processes and techniques to characterize security risk could improve NNSA's understanding of security vulnerabilities and guide more effective resource allocation. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
505 0 |a Frontmatter -- Preface to the Abbreviated Version -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Reviewers -- Contents -- Executive Summary -- Summary -- References -- Biographical Sketches of Committee Members -- Appendix A: Statement of Task -- Appendix B: Acronyms 
546 |a English. 
650 0 |a Nuclear weapons plants  |x Security measures  |z United States. 
650 0 |a Nuclear weapons industry  |x Risk management  |z United States. 
650 7 |a TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING  |x Military Science.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a HISTORY  |x Military  |x Other.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Nuclear weapons plants  |x Security measures  |2 fast 
651 7 |a United States  |2 fast  |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex.  |t Understanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex (abbreviated version).  |d Washington, D.C. : National Academies Presss, ©2011  |z 9780309208840  |w (OCoLC)725437054 
856 4 0 |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/holycrosscollege-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3378766  |y Click for online access 
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