Description
| Summary: | This paper develops and empirically tests a political economy model of sovereign debt. The main incentive for repaying sovereign debt is to maintain access to international capital markets. However, in a democracy, one generation may choose default regardless of its consequences for future generations. An old generation with little concern for its country's access to capital markets can force a default on debt if it has the majority of voters. On the other hand, if the younger generation is more numerous, it can force repayment of previously defaulted debt. Other voter heterogeneities, such as in income, can generate similar results.
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| Item Description: | "June 2008." |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (34 pages) : illustrations |
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| Format: | Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. |
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| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-25). |
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| ISBN: | 1451914636
9781451914634
9781451870107
1451870108 |
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| ISSN: | 2227-8885 ; |
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| Reproduction Note: | Electronic reproduction. |
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| Source of Description, Etc. Note: | Print version record. |
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| Action Note: | digitized |
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