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ocn816348138 |
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OCoLC |
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20241006213017.0 |
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m o d |
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cr un|---uuuuu |
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121012s1999 xx o 000 0 eng d |
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|a IDEBK
|b eng
|e pn
|c IDEBK
|d OCLCQ
|d EBLCP
|d OCLCQ
|d HS0
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCF
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCL
|d UEJ
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|a 1282384147
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|a 9781282384149
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|a (OCoLC)816348138
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|a HM621
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|a HPK, HPJ
|2 bicssc
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| 049 |
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|a HCDD
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| 245 |
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|a Philosophy after Objectivity :
|b Making Sense in Perspective.
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| 260 |
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|b Oxford University Press, USA
|c 1999.
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource (280 pages)
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| 336 |
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
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|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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|a Since the beginning of philosophy, philosophers have sought objective knowledge: knowledge of things whose existence does not depend on one's conceiving of them. This book uses lessons from debates over objective knowledge to characterize the kinds of reasons pertinent to philosophical and other theoretical views. It argues that we cannot meet skeptics' typical demands for nonquestion-begging support for claims to objective truth, and that therefore we should not regard our supporting reasons as resistant to skeptical challenges. One key lesson is that a constructive, explanatory approach to philosophy must change the subject from skeptic-resistant reasons to perspectival reasons arising from variable semantic commitments and instrumental, purpose-relative considerations. The book lays foundations for such a reorientation of philosophy, treating fundamental methodological issues in ontology, epistemology, the theory of meaning, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of practical rationality. It explains how certain perennial debates in philosophy rest not on genuine disagreement, but on conceptual diversity: talk about different matters. The book shows how acknowledgment of conceptual diversity can resolve a range of traditional disputes in philosophy. It also explains why philosophers need not anchor their discipline in the physicalism of the natural sciences.
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|a Intro; Contents; Introduction: Objectivity and Relativity in Philosophy; 1. Ontology, Evidence, and Philosophical Questions; 1.1 What the Greeks Wrought; 1.2 Realism versus Conceptualism; 1.3 Essences and Conceptual Taking; 1.4 Realism, Criteria, and Modes of Existence; 1.5 Realism and How Things Are; 1.6 Aristotelian Essence-Realism; 1.7 An Epistemological Problem; A.A General Agnostic Argument; B. Refining the Agnostic Argument; 1.8 Philosophy after Agnosticism; 2. Justification, Meta-Epistemology, and Meaning; 2.1 Three Epistemological Projects
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|a 2.2 An Epistemological Dilemma: Naivete or Circularity?2.3 Semantic Foundationalism; A. Notions and Conceptual Commitments; B. Arguing for Justification; C. Evaluating and Explaining Justification; 2.4 Objections and Metaphilosophical Lessons; A. Preanalytic Data, Ordinary Language, and Essences; B. Notions and Philosophical Problems; C. Conceptual Relativism Introduced; 2.5 Two Epistemological Extremes; 2.6 A General Epistemological Moral; 3. Meaning, Interpretation, and Analyticity; 3.1 Ways of Meaning; 3.2 Rules, Regularities, and Social Agreements; A. Rule-Governed Use
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|a B. Regularities and Social Agreements,3.3 Semantic Interpretationism; A. Purposive Linguistic Use; B. Meaning and Interpretation; C. Interpretively Purposive Use; 3.4 Correctness in Use; 3.5 Whither Analyticity?; 3.6 Standards for Analyticity: Carnap versus Quine; 3.7 Analyticity Regained; 3.8 Analyticity in Epistemology; 4. Reasons, Truth, and Relativism; 4.1 Concepts of Truth; 4.2 Concepts of Reasons; 4.3 The Fate of Relativism; 4.4 Practical Ideals and Practical Relevance; 4.5 Purposive Reasons and a Multiplicity Problem; A. Evaluative Purposes and Relativism; B. Internalism
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|a 4.6 Conceptual Instrumentalism5. Physicalism, Action, and Explanation; 5.1 Is Physicalism Coherent?; A. An Argument Against Physicalism; B. Individual and Socially Shared Truth-Conditions; C. Physicalism and Reduction; 5.2 Nonreductive Physicalism and Supervenience; A. Global Supervenience; B.A Problem for Universal Global Supervenience; 5.3 Physicalism and Action Theory; A. Two Modes of Explanation; B. Physicalism and Explanatory Strategies; C. Return to Action; 5.4 Whither Philosophy?; Appendix: Charity, Interpretation, and Truth; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N
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| 505 |
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|a OP; Q; R; S; T; U; V; W; Z
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| 650 |
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|a Objectivity.
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| 650 |
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|a Realism.
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| 650 |
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|a Relativity.
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| 650 |
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|a Perspective (Philosophy)
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Objectivity
|2 fast
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Perspective (Philosophy)
|2 fast
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| 650 |
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|a Realism
|2 fast
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| 650 |
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|a Relativity
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| 720 |
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|a Paul K. Moser.
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| 856 |
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|u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/holycrosscollege-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5745562
|y Click for online access
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| 903 |
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|a EBC-AC
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| 994 |
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|a 92
|b HCD
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