The value of living well

The value of living well / Mark LeBar.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: LeBar, Mark
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2013.
Subjects:
Conduct of life.
Normativity (Ethics)
Virtue.
ethics (philosophical concept)
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Conduct of life
Virtue
Meta-ethiek.
Aristotelisme.
Deugden.
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Cover; Table of Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; PART ONE; 1. Aristotle on Ends; I.1. Human Life and Agency; I.2. Ends; I.2.1. Ends as Constraints; I.2.2. Ends, Reasons, and "For the Sake of Which"; I.3. The Aristotelian Framework; I.4. Unhelpful Friends; I.5. Scanlon; 2. Challenges to the Structure; II.1. No Ultimate End; II.2. Long-Chains Views; II.3. The Looping Model; II.4. The real challenge to the Aristotelian framework; II.5. Pseudo-pluralism; II.6. Political Pluralism; II.7. Telic Pluralism; II.8. What the Implausibility of Telic Pluralism Teaches Us; II.9. Relative Monism
  • 3. Living WellIII. 1. Ancient Argument about Our Ultimate End; III. 2. Begin with Agency; III. 2.1. Subordinating Patiency; III. 3. First Nature; III. 4. Second Nature; III. 5. The VE Proposal; 4. Succeeding as Rational and Social Animals; IV. 1. The Contribution of Rationality; IV. 1.1. End-Setting; IV. 1.2. Judgment in Action; IV. 1.3. Training the Passions; IV. 2. Sociality; IV. 2.1. Sociality and Shared Ends; IV. 2.2. Caring for Others; IV. 2.3. The Agent-Relativity of Welfare and Care; IV. 2.4. Living Well in Community; IV. 3. Individual Difference; IV. 4. Autonomy; IV. 5. Objections
  • IV. 5.1. MisconceptionsIV. 5.2. Virtue's Commitments; PART TWO; 5. Constructivism; V.1. Motivation for the Approach; V.2. Taxonomy: Constructivism and Realism; V.3. Recognitionalism: Evidence For and Against; V.3.1. Rational Recognition; V.3.2. Reversal of Values and Conditional Value; V.3.2.1. RV and CV in Plato; V.3.2.2. RV and CV in the Stoics and Aristotle; V.3.2.3. Constructivism in Aristotle: The Doctrine of the Mean; V.3.3. RV Considered; V.3.4. The Constructed Value of Unconditional Goods; V.4. Practical Rationality, Agency, and Activity; V.4.1. Background: Realism
  • v. 4.2. Action GuidanceV. 4.3. The Failure of Recognitionalism; V.4.4. Naturalism; V.5. Particularism and Recognitionalism; 6. General and Particular; VI. 1. The Basic Argument; VI. 2. The Problem in Kant; VI. 2.1. The Problem in Korsgaard; VI. 2.2. The Problem in Herman; VI. 2.3. The Problem in O'Neill; VI. 3. The Upshot for Generalist Constructivism; VI. 4. Recognitionalist Particularism; 7. Fitting Judgment; VII. 1. First-Person, Third-Person; VII. 1.1. Case in Point; VII. 2. Constructivist Particularism-An Overview; VII. 3. Conditions of Judgment; VII. 4. Fittingness; VII. 4.1. The Fitting in Aristotle
  • VII. 4.2. The Fitting in Samuel ClarkeVII. 4.3. The Fitting in Later Theorists; VII. 5. Fittingness as a Normative Standard for Judgment; VII. 5.1. The Fittingness Relation; VII. 5.2. What Is Fitted to Conditions; VII. 5.3. Fittingness, the Good Life, and Comparability; VII. 5.4. Examples 203; 8. Critical Assessment; VIII. 1. Evaluation, Supervenience, and Justification; VIII. 1.1. The Nature of Supervenience in Detail; VIII. 1.2. Supervenience-Explanation; VIII. 1.3. Supervenience-Application; VIII. 2. Publicity; VIII. 3. The Relation between Standpoints; VIII. 4. Objectivity and Subjectivity; PART THREE

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