Foundations of an ethics of belief

Foundations of an ethics of belief / Anne Meylan.

In the course of our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one's bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand too that we may be praised or...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Meylan, Anne
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag, ©2013.
Series:Practical philosophy ; Bd. 15.
Subjects:
Ethics.
Social ethics.
ethics (philosophy)
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
PHILOSOPHY > Social.
Ethics
Social ethics
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • TABLE OF CONTENTS; INTRODUCTION; The initial intuition; Main objective; Preliminary clarificatory remarks; Two central problems; The problem of control and responsibility; The normative problem; Abstracts of the chapters; Chapter 1: What the philosophy of action teaches us; Chapter 2: The impossibility of acquiring beliefs directly for reasons; Chapter 3: Pascalian and theoretical control; Chapter 4: Doxastic responsibility as responsibility for consequences; Chapter 5: Epistemic praiseworthiness and epistemic blameworthiness; Chapter 6: Beyond epistemic justifiedness.
  • Chapter 7: Epistemic justifiedness and non-epistemic justifiednessChapter 1: What the philosophy of action teaches us; Actions and happenings; Non-reductionist conception of action; Reductionist conception of action; Actions, happenings and activities; Acting for reasons; Three distinctions about reasons; Motivating reasons vs. normative reasons; Internalism vs. externalism about reasons; Humean vs. anti-Humean conception of motivation; Back to the doxastic realm; Epistemic reasons, non-epistemic reasons and evidence; Delineating the interesting issue.
  • Chapter 2: The Impossibility of directly acquiring beliefs for reasonsDirect and indirect belief acquisitions; Direct/indirect acquisitions of belief and epistemic/non-epistemic reasons; Williams' argument; "To believe that p is to believe that p is true"; Believing vs. imagining; Transparency; The teleological account; Conclusions; Chapter 3: Theoretical and Pascalian control; Two forms of indirect doxastic control; Theoretical control; Pascalian control; Indirect doxastic influence on belief acquisitions; Unlimited doxastic control considered; Ryan's unlimited doxastic control.
  • Pieces of evidence vs. motivating reasonsSteup's unlimited doxastic control; Chapter 4: Doxastic Responsibility as Responsibility for Consequences; Responsibility for consequences; Responsibility for basic actions; Responsibility for the consequences of actions; Responsibility for resultant belief acquisitions, theoretical and Pascalian control; Responsibility for resultant belief acquisitions and indirect doxastic influence; Responsibility for believing; Chapter 5: Epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; Epistemic and non-epistemic desirability; The fundamental epistemic end.
  • Other epistemically desirable statesThe fundamental epistemic end: some specifications; Epistemic and non-epistemic ends: summary; Varieties of epistemic goodness*; Final and instrumental epistemic goodness; Epistemic rationality and epistemic commendability; Varieties of epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; Final and instrumental epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; Epistemic praiseworthiness/blameworthiness for rational belief acquisitions.

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