Property possession as identity : an essay in metaphysics / Patrick X. Monaghan.

In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Monaghan, Patrick X.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag, 2011.
Series:Philosophische Analyse ; Bd. 41.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access

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100 1 |a Monaghan, Patrick X. 
245 1 0 |a Property possession as identity :  |b an essay in metaphysics /  |c Patrick X. Monaghan. 
260 |a Frankfurt :  |b Ontos Verlag,  |c 2011. 
300 |a 1 online resource (121 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical analysis ;  |v Bd. 41 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
505 0 |a CHAPTER I; INTRODUCTION; 1. A long-neglected dispute between Plato and Aristotle. 1; 2. The account to be defended.; 3. Some potential misconceptions about my account.; 4. The highly metaphorical nature of other accounts.; 5. An historical precedent for my account.; 6. The plan.; 7. Some methodological points about my account.; 8. Some methodological points about the problem my account solves.; 9. A theory of properties.; 9.1. What is it for something to be a property?; 9.2. What are the existence-conditions for properties?; 9.3. What are the individuation-conditions for properties? 
505 8 |a AGAINST INTERNALISM1. Introduction.; CHAPTER II; 2. Against Paul's view.; 3. Against Denkel's view.; 4. The view of Aristotle.; 5. Against Internalism in general.; CHAPTER III; AGAINST EXTERNALISM; 1. Introduction.; 2. Against Predicate Nominalism.; 3. Against Concept Nominalism.; 4. Against Class Nominalism.; 5. Against Resemblance Nominalism.; 5.1. Rodriguez-Pereyra's version of the view.; 5.2. The mind-dependence of resemblance.; 5.3. The argument.; 6. Against Traditional Externalism.; 7. Against Externalism in general.; CHAPTER IV; THE VIEW OF PLATO; 1. Introduction. 
505 8 |a 2. Plato's view for sensible things. 3. A novel interpretation of Plato's theory of forms.; 4. Plato on the self predication of the forms.; 5. Plato and the third man.; 6. Evaluation of Plato's view.; CHAPTER V; AGAINST HYBRID VIEWS; 1. Introduction.; 2. Against the view of Armstrong.; 3. Against the view of Zalta.; 4. Against hybrid views in general.; 5. Against Baxter's view.; CHAPTER VI; PROPERTY POSSESSION AS IDENTITY; 1. Introduction.; 2. Premise one:; 3. Premise two:; 4. Premise three:; 5. Premise four:; CHAPTER VII; OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; 1. Introduction.; 2. The nature of an entity. 
505 8 |a 3. N and its truth. 4. Objections and replies.; 4.1. The many over the one.; 4.2. The one over the many.; 4.3. Property possession and predication.; 4.4. The 'is' of predication and the 'is' of identity.; 4.5. My account and change.; 4.6. My account and modality.; 4.7. A world of properties alone.; 5. The substratum versus the bundle theories.; 6. The problem of property-unification.; 7. The problem of the principle of individuation.; BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
520 |a In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account. 
546 |a English. 
650 0 |a Identity (Philosophical concept) 
650 0 |a Metaphysics. 
650 7 |a identity.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a metaphysics.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x History & Surveys  |x Ancient & Classical.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Identity (Philosophical concept)  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Metaphysics  |2 fast 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Monaghan, Patrick X.  |t Property Possession as Identity : An Essay in Metaphysics.  |d Berlin : De Gruyter, ©2011  |z 9783110325089 
830 0 |a Philosophische Analyse ;  |v Bd. 41. 
856 4 0 |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/holycrosscollege-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1215587  |y Click for online access 
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