Hume's epistemology in the Treatise : a veritistic interpretation

Hume's epistemology in the Treatise : a veritistic interpretation / Frederick F. Schmitt.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schmitt, Frederick F., 1951-
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Subjects:
Hume, David, > 1711-1776 > Criticism and interpretation.
Hume, David, > 1711-1776. > Treatise of human nature.
Hume, David, > 1711-1776
Treatise of human nature (Hume, David)
Knowledge, Theory of > Early works to 1800.
PHILOSOPHY > History & Surveys > Modern.
Knowledge, Theory of
Criticism, interpretation, etc.
Early works
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • ""Cover""; ""HumeÂ?s Epistemology in the Treatise: ""; ""Copyright""; ""Dedication""; ""Acknowledgements""; ""Contents by Chapters""; ""Contents by Sections""; ""References""; ""1: The Epistemological Framework""; ""1.1 The Erosion of Knowledge in HumeÂ?s Predecessors""; ""1.2 The Epistemological Framework and its Consequences for HumeÂ?s Account of Justified Belief""; ""1.3 Constraints of the Framework and their Implications for the Account of Justified Belief""; ""1.4 What an Account of Justified Belief is""; ""1.5 Defeasible and Overall Justification""
  • 1.6 The Broader Historical Background of the Reliability Account of Justified Belief and Veritistic Epistemology1.7 Conclusion
  • Preview of the Divisions
  • DIVISION I: Knowledge, Belief, and Justification
  • Preview of Division I
  • 2: Knowledge (1.3.1)
  • 2.1 Locke on the Psychology of Knowledge
  • 2.2 Locke on the Psychology of Probability
  • 2.3 Locke on the Epistemology of Knowledge, Probability, and Certainty
  • 2.4 Locke on the Epistemology of Certainty and Evidence
  • 2.5 Locke on the Extent of Knowledge
  • 2.6 The Psychology and Extent of Knowledge
  • 2.7 The Certainty of Knowledge2.8 Infallibility
  • 2.9 The Certainty of Proofs
  • 2.10 Knowledge and Justified Belief
  • 2.11 Applying Knowledge
  • 2.12 One Reliability or Two?
  • 2.13 Conclusion
  • 3: The Natural Function of Beliefs (1.3.10)
  • 3.1 Locke on the Purpose of Judgements
  • 3.2 The Nature of Beliefs
  • 3.3 The Natural Function of Beliefs
  • 3.4 Which Perceptions are Ascribed a Natural Function?
  • 3.5 Which Natural Functions are Ascribed?
  • 3.6 Causal Inference and the Natural Function of Beliefs
  • ""3.7 The Natural Function of Beliefs and Veritistic Epistemology""""3.8 Conclusion""; ""4: Justified Belief""; ""4.1 `JustÂ? and its Cognates""; ""4.2 The Association of `JustÂ? and `TrueÂ?""; ""4.3 Other Epistemic Terms and Reliability""; ""4.4 Conclusion""; ""Summary of Division I""; ""DIVISION II: Causal Inference""; ""Preview of Division II""; ""5: Causal Inference (1.3.2, 4, and 6)""; ""5.1 From Lockean Reasoning to Humean Inference""; ""5.2 The Argument that Only Causal Inference Assures Us of Unobserved Existences (1.3.2)""
  • 5.3 The Argument that Causal Inference Must Begin with a Sense Impression (1.3.4)5.4 The Argument that Causal Inference is Not Lockean Reasoning (1.3.6)
  • 5.5 The Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying in 1.3.6
  • 5.6 The Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying in 1.3.6 and the Reliability Interpretation
  • 5.7 Alleged Evidence for a Sceptical Interpretation of 1.3.6
  • 5.8 The Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying and Part 4 Scepticism
  • 5.9 Conclusion
  • 6: The Justification that Causal Inference is Justifying (1.3.8, 12, and 15)

Similar Items