Description
Summary: | Modern economics has largely ignored the issue of outright conflict as an alternative way of allocating goods, assuming instead the existence of well-defined property rights enforced by an undefined third party. And yet even in ostensibly peaceful market transactions, conflict exists as an outside option, sometimes constraining the outcomes reached through voluntary agreement. In this volume, economists offer a crucial rational-choice perspective on conflict, using methodological approaches that range from the game theoretic to the experimental.
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xviii, 285 pages) : illustrations |
Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
ISBN: | 9780262321976 0262321971 9781306491150 1306491150 |
DOI: | 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026895.001.0001 |
Source of Description, Etc. Note: | Print version record. |