Problems from Reid

Problems from Reid / James Van Cleve.

James Van Cleve here shows why Thomas Reid (1710-96) deserves a place alongside the other canonical figures of modern philosophy. He expounds Reid's positions and arguments on a wide range of topics, taking interpretive stands on points where his meaning is disputed and assessing the value of h...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Van Cleve, James (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2015]
Subjects:
Reid, Thomas, > 1710-1796.
Reid, Thomas, > 1710-1796
Ethics, Modern.
PHILOSOPHY > History & Surveys > Modern.
Ethics, Modern
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Cover; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1. Sensation and Perception; A. Explanations of Terms; B. Sensation versus Perception; C. Reid's Threefold Account of Perception; D. The Conception in Perception; E. Perception and Belief; F. Consciousness and Attention; G. Are Sensations Self-Reflexive?; 2. Reid's Nativism; A. Reid's Nativism; B. Natural Signs; C. The Experimentum Crucis; D. Responses to the Experimentum Crucis; E. Woulds, Coulds, or Shoulds?; F. Nativism as an Antidote to Skepticism; 3. Direct Realism versus the Way of Ideas; A. The Way of Ideas.
  • B. First Argument for the Way of Ideas: No Action at a DistanceC. Second Argument for the Way of Ideas: Hume's Table Argument; D. Third Argument for the Way of Ideas: Double Vision; E. Fourth Argument for the Way of Ideas: Malebranche's Master Argument; F. Three Forms of Direct Realism; G. Do Sensations Obstruct Direct Perception?; H. Is Reid a Presentational Direct Realist?; I. All Perception Is Direct Perception; 4. Primary and Secondary Qualities; A. Reid's Relation to Locke and Berkeley; B. The Real Foundation: Epistemological or Metaphysical?; C. Dispositions or Bases?
  • D. Intrinsic or Extrinsic?E. Fixed or Variable?; F. Four Views that Conflict with Reid's; 5. Acquired Perception; A. The Mechanics of Acquired Perception; B. Is Acquired Perception Really Perception?; C. Are Secondary Qualities Objects of Acquired Perception Only?; D. Does Acquired Perception Alter the Content of Our Original Perceptions?; E. Could Anything Become an Object of Acquired Perception?; F. Is Reid Inconsistent about the Requisites of Perception?; 6. The Geometry of Visibles; A. The Properties of Spherical Figures; B. Depth Is Not Perceived.
  • C. The Argument from IndistinguishabilityD. Visibles as Sense Data; E. Coincidence as Identity; F. Angell's Approach; G. The Argument of Paragraph 4; H. The Real Basis of the Geometry of Visibles; I. Does the Geometry of Visibles Jeopardize Direct Realism?; J. What Are Visibles?; K. Direct Realism and Seeing What We Touch; L. Visible Figure as a Relativized Property of Ordinary Objects; M. Mediated but Direct?; 7. Erect and Inverted Vision; A. The Naïve Puzzle and Rock's Question; B. The Classical Solution; C. Berkeley's Solution(s) to the Naïve Puzzle.
  • D. Reid's Alternative to Berkeley's SolutionE. Answers to Rock's Question; F. Experiments with Inverting Lenses; G. Perceptual Adaptation; 8. Molyneux's Question; A. Molyneux's Question; B. Empirical Evidence; C. Berkeley's Answer; D. Reid's Answer(s); E. Is Berkeley's Modus Tollens Reid's Modus Ponens?; F. The One-Two Molyneux Question; G. Concluding Confession; 9. Memory and Personal Identity; A. Things Obvious and Certain with Regard to Memory; B. Critique of the Impression and Idea Theories of Memory; C. Memory as Direct Awareness of Things Past; D. The Specious Present.

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