Limits of moral authority.

Limits of moral authority.

Dale Dorsey considers one of the most important questions in philosophical ethics: to what extent do the demands of morality have authority over us and our lives? He defends a position that runs counter to the traditional view, and argues that we are not required to conform to moral demands. Further...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dorsey, Dale, 1976- (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY : Oxford Univ Press, 2016.
Subjects:
Ethics.
ethics (philosophy)
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
PHILOSOPHY > Social.
Ethics
Ethik
Normenbegründung
Autorität
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Cover; The Limits of Moral Authority; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; People; Places; Things; Introduction; I.1. A Practical Conflict; I.2. The Question; I.3. An Important Assumption about Practical Reason; 1: The Concept of Normative Authority; 1.1. Conceptual Apparatus; 1.1.1. Standpoints; 1.1.2. From Reasons to Requirements (and Other Evaluations); 1.1.3. Mattering; 1.2. Question; 1.2.1. Answers; 1.2.2. Hume Exegesis-or-What Question Isn't; 1.3. Normative Pluralism; 1.3.1. Copp's Reductio; 1.3.2. Reductio Reconsidered; 1.3.3. Resisting the Regress.
  • 1.3.4. The Regress in More Detail1.3.5. How to Avoid the Regress; 1.3.6. Objection: But Aren't Morality and Prudence Independently Normative?; 1.3.7. Objection: Vitiating Moral Inquiry; 1.3.8. One Last Terminological Note; 1.4. What Marks Morality?; 1.5. Conclusion; 2: A Priori Rationalism; 2.1. Three Arguments for a Priori Rationalism; 2.1.1. Importance; 2.1.2. Analyticity; 2.1.3. Grounding Morality; 2.2. Against a Priori Rationalism: Two Arguments; 2.2.1. The Explanation Argument; 2.2.2. The Epistemological Argument; 2.3. Objection: A Priori Reasons; 2.4. Substantive Rationalism.
  • 2.5. Conclusion:TheWay Forward3: Supremacy and Impartiality; 3.1. The Principle of Moral Impartiality; 3.2. Objections to the PMI; 3.2.1. Clues; 3.2.2. Demandingness; 3.2.3. The Near and Dear; 3.2.4. An Exegetical Sidebar:Williams on Morality; 3.2.5. Why the Reliance on Moral Rationalism Generalizes; 3.3. Why Supremacy Fails; 3.3.1. Objection: Misinterpreting Arguments for Moral Partiality; 3.3.2. Objection: Proves Too Much; 3.4. Scheffler on Morality and Human Valuing; 3.5. The Nature and Content of Impartiality; 3.5.1. Cullity on Extreme Demands; 3.5.2. Second-Order Impartiality.
  • 3.5.3. Interpersonality3.6. Conclusion; 4: Supremacy and the Supererogatory; 4.1. The Traditional View; 4.2. A Challenge for the Traditional View; 4.3. Satisficing; 4.4. The Portmore/Raz View; 4.5. The Bounds of Moral Justification; 4.6. The Anti-Rationalist View; 4.7. How to Accommodate the Anti-Rationalist View; 4.8. Reconsidering Stan; 4.9. Why Supremacy Fails (Again); 4.10. Conclusion; 5: Defending and Rejecting Permission, Part One: Defending; 5.1. The Normative Default; 5.2. Prudence; 5.2.1. Net-Gain Moral Requirements; 5.2.2. Objection:The Rational Force of Prudence per se.
  • 5.2.3. Objection: A Reductio5.2.4. Objection: Sidgwick Strikes Back; 5.2.5. Objection: Can You Justify Doing LessThird-Personally?; 5.2.6. Objection: Jerks and the Rich; 5.2.7. Net-Loss Moral Requirements; 5.3. The Near and Dear; 5.3.1. Rejecting Associative Obligations; 5.3.2. Selfhood and Relation A; 5.3.3. Alternatives to Relation A; 5.3.4. Associative Obligations to Self; 5.4. Is Permission Coherent?; 5.4.1. Objection: Tipping the Balance; 5.4.2. Objection: Ad Hoc; 5.5. Conclusion; 6: Defending and Rejecting Permission, Part Two: Rejecting.

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