Love and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics : Aristotle, Lonergan, and Nussbaum on Emotions and Moral Insight.

Drawing on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the work of Bernard Lonergan and Martha Nussbaum, Robert J. Fitterer tests the assumption that the inclusion of the emotions leads to bias in objective judgments or when determining moral truths.

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Fitterer, Robert J.
Format:	eBook
Language:	English
Published:	Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 2008.
Edition:	2nd ed.
Subjects:	Aristotle. Lonergan, Bernard J. F. Nussbaum, Martha C. > (Martha Craven), > 1947- Aristotle Virtue. Ethics. Objectivity. Love > Philosophy. Emotions. ethics (philosophy) Emotions Ethics Love > Philosophy Objectivity Virtue
Online Access:	Click for online access

Table of Contents:

Intro
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Books I, II, III, and VI
Key Sections in the Nicomachean Ethics
Four Cognitive Operations Central to Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight
Summary
2 Lonergan's Theory of Insight and Cognitive Operations
The Nature of Insight
The Unrestricted Nature of Questioning and the 'Pure Desire to Know'
Two Cognitive Roles for Emotion
Summary and Critique of Lonergan's Theory
3 Lonergan's 'Common Sense Insight' and Its Relation to Phronesis
Common Sense: Intelligence Directed at Concrete Living
Construing the World: Lonergan's 'Patterns of Experience'
Emotions and the Problem of Bias
A Kuhnian Objection Considered
Summary
4 Emotive Perception of Value and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics
Nussbaum on Emotions as Value Judgments
Coming to Grips with Bias
Another Look at Patterns of Experience and Salience Selection
Love as a Ground for Procedural Objectivity
Concluding Summary
Notes
References
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
R
S
T
U
V
W.

Love and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics : Aristotle, Lonergan, and Nussbaum on Emotions and Moral Insight.

Similar Items