Applied economic analysis of information and risk

Applied economic analysis of information and risk / Moriki Hosoe, Iltae Kim.

This book examines interesting new topics in applied economics from the perspectives of the economics of information and risk, two fields of economics that address the consequences of asymmetric information, environmental risk and uncertainty for the nature and efficiency of interactions between ind...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hosoe, Moriki (Author), Kim, Iltae (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Singapore : Springer, [2020]
Subjects:
Economics.
Information science > Economic aspects.
Risk.
economics.
Economics
Information science > Economic aspects
Risk
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Preface
  • Contents
  • 1 Introduction: Applied Economics of Information and Risk
  • References
  • Part I Information and Its Applications
  • 2 Incomplete Contract, Transaction-Specific Investment, and Bargaining Power
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Contract Incompleteness and Hold-Up
  • 2.2.1 Unverifiability of the Level of Effort and the Quality of Goods
  • 2.2.2 Sequential Investment and Option Contract
  • 2.3 Bargaining Power and Information
  • 2.3.1 The Allocation of Bargaining Power and Information
  • 2.3.2 Ex-Ante Renegotiation and Bargaining Power
  • 2.4 Investment and the Bargaining (I)
  • 2.4.1 Transaction-Specific Investment and Its Verifiability
  • 2.4.2 Bargaining and Optimal Investment
  • 2.4.3 Verifiable Investment and the Two-Stage Bargaining
  • 2.5 Investment and the Bargaining (II)
  • 2.6 Transaction-Specific Investment and Business Groups
  • 2.6.1 Reservation Price
  • 2.6.2 Equilibrium Probability of Group Cancellation
  • 2.6.3 Optimal Trading Specific Investment
  • 2.7 Concluding Remarks
  • References
  • 3 Effectiveness of Mandatory Disclosure for Consumer Policy
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Verifiable Information
  • 3.3 Disclosure of Unverifiable Information
  • 3.4 Mandatory Disclosure and Bounded Rationality
  • 3.5 The Role of Information Policy and Information Intermediaries
  • References
  • 4 Ex-ante Regulation, Ex-post Regulation, and Collusion
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Regulation with Monitoring
  • 4.2.1 Monitoring and Penalty
  • 4.2.2 Action Choice and Optimal Regulation
  • 4.3 Ex-post Regulation System
  • 4.3.1 Investigation and Signal
  • 4.3.2 Optimal Investigation System
  • 4.4 Regulation and Collusion
  • 4.4.1 Collusion of Investigator and Firm
  • 4.4.2 Collusion-Proof Penalty System
  • 4.4.3 Collusion-Allowed Penalty System
  • 4.4.4 Hierarchical Monitoring System
  • 4.5 Concluding Remarks
  • References
  • 5 Effort Observability and Wage Promotion in an Internal Labor Market
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 Labor in Employment
  • 5.2.1 Characteristics of Labor
  • 5.2.2 Discretion and Employment
  • 5.2.3 The Role of Monitoring
  • 5.3 The Model of Wage Promotion in an Internal Market
  • 5.3.1 Japanese Internal Labor Market
  • 5.4 The Model
  • 5.5 Optimal Wage Contract
  • 5.6 Efficiency of Promotion System
  • 5.7 Concluding Remarks
  • References
  • 6 Comparative Analysis of Politician-Bureaucratic Governance Structure and Citizens' Preference
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 The Model
  • 6.2.1 The Bureaucrats' Utility
  • 6.2.2 The Politicians' Utility
  • 6.2.3 The Citizens' Utility
  • 6.3 The First Best Effort Level and Allocation of Authority
  • 6.4 Dominant Politicians System
  • 6.4.1 The Bureaucrats' Decision Making
  • 6.4.2 The Politicians' Decision Making
  • 6.4.3 The Comparative Statics
  • 6.4.4 The Comparison with the First-Best
  • 6.5 The Case that the Allocation of Authority Is Decided Constitutionally

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