Philosophy and climate change / edited by Mark Budolfson, Tristram McPherson, and David Plunkett.

This volume illustrates the diverse ways that philosophy can contribute to conversations around climate change, and explores the ways in which thinking about climate change can help to illuminate a range of topics of independent interest to philosophers.

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Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Budolfson, Mark (Editor), McPherson, Tristram Colin, 1975- (Editor), Plunkett, David (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2021.
Edition:First edition.
Series:Engaging philosophy.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Philosophy and Climate Change
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • List of Contributors
  • Abstracts of Chapters
  • Section I. Valuing Climate Change Impacts
  • 1 A Convenient Truth? Climate Change and Quality of Life
  • 2 Animals and Climate Change
  • 3 Discounting under Risk: Utilitarianism vs. Prioritarianism
  • 4 A Philosopher's Guide to Discounting
  • 5 Does Climate Change Policy Depend Importantly on Population Ethics? Deflationary Responses to the Challenges of Population Ethics for Public Policy
  • Section II. Cognition, Emotions, and Climate Change
  • 7 The Wages of Fear? Toward Fearing Well About Climate Change
  • 8 Climate Change and Cultural Cognition
  • Section III. Climate Change and Individual Ethics
  • 9 Climate Change and Individual Obligations: A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach, and the Need for an Imperfect View
  • 10 The Puzzle of Inefficacy
  • 11 On Individual and Shared Obligations: In Defense of the Activist's Perspective
  • 12 How Much Harm Does Each of Us Do?
  • Section IV. Climate Change and Politics
  • 13 How Quickly Should the World Reduce its Greenhouse Gas Emissions? Climate Change and the Structure of Intergenerational Justice
  • 14 Political Realism, Feasibility Wedges, and Opportunities for Collective Action on Climate Change
  • 15 Pareto Improvements and Feasible Climate Solutions
  • 16 Climate Change, Liberalism, and the Public/Private Distinction
  • Introduction
  • Section I: Valuing Climate Change Impacts
  • Chapter 1: A Convenient Truth?: Climate Change and Quality of Life
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Nature and Measure of Subjective Well-Being
  • 3. Subjective Well-Beingand Its Correlates
  • 4. Affect as Information and Guidance
  • 5. Affect and Subjective Well-Being
  • 6. A Recent Critique
  • 7. Subjective Well-Beingand Climate
  • References.
  • Chapter 2: Animals and Climate Change
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Farmed Animals, Climate Change, and a Duty to Resist
  • 3. Wild Animals, Climate Change, and a Duty to Assist
  • 4. Animals, Climate Change, and a Life Worth Living
  • 5. Animals, Climate Change, and a Life Worth Creating
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 3: Discounting under Risk: Utilitarianism vs. Prioritarianism
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Choice of the Social Welfare Framework: Utilitarianism vs. Prioritarianism
  • 2.1 Risk and Equity: Aggregation Issues
  • 2.2 Social Welfare Function
  • 3. Implications for Discounting
  • 3.1 Preliminaries
  • 3.2 Utilitarianism and the Ramsey Rule
  • 3.3 Utilitarian Discounting and the Precautionary Effect
  • 3.4 Discounting under Alternative Welfare Frameworks
  • 4. Conclusions
  • References
  • Chapter 4: A Philosopher's Guide to Discounting
  • 1. Introducing and Defending the Ramsey Rule
  • 2. Why the Terms of Measurement Matter
  • 3. Descriptivism and Prescriptivism in Discounting Methodology
  • 4. The Role of Moral Experts in Parameter Assignments
  • 5. Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 5: Does Climate Change Policy Depend Importantly on Population Ethics?: Deflationary Responses to the Challenges of Population Ethics for Public Policy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Population Axiology and the Repugnant Conclusion
  • 3. First Deflationary Response: Axiologies May Agree about Climate Change
  • 4. Second Deflationary Response: Bounded Population Principles
  • 4.1 Axiology with Population Size Bounds
  • 4.2 Possibility Proof for Escaping the Repugnant Conclusion while Satisfying Bounded Versions of Population Ethics Desiderata
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Appendix: A Smoothness Axiom and a New Argument for Total Utilitarianism
  • References
  • Section II: Cognition, Emotions, and Climate Change
  • Chapter 6: Way to Go, Me
  • 1. Introduction.
  • 2. Climate Change as a Creeping Environmental Problem
  • 3. Different Orientations
  • 4. Switching Between Orientations and Mindset M
  • 5. Seeking Self-Praiseversus Avoiding Self-Blame
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 7: The Wages of Fear?: Toward Fearing Well About Climate Change
  • 1. The Promise of Fear
  • 2. The Wages of Fear
  • 3. The Possibility of Hope
  • 4. The Perils of Hope
  • 5. Civic Fear
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 8: Climate Change and Cultural Cognition
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Cultural Cognition
  • 3. Values or Beliefs?
  • 4. Cultural Cognition and Coincidence
  • 5. Geoengineering
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • Section III: Climate Change and Individual Ethics
  • Chapter 9: Climate Change and Individual Obligations: A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach, and the Need for an Imperfect View
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach
  • 3. Diagnosis
  • 4. The Imperfect Approach
  • 5. Extension to Other Cases
  • References
  • Chapter 10: The Puzzle of Inefficacy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Introducing the Puzzle of Inefficacy
  • 3. Ethical Structure and Social Structure
  • 4. Contribution Ethics: A Sketch
  • 5. Negligibility and Interaction
  • 6. Conclusions
  • References
  • Chapter 11: On Individual and Shared Obligations: In Defense of the Activist's Perspective
  • 1. The Activist's Perspective
  • 2. Two Problems of Individual Incapability and Group Agency
  • 3. Obligations
  • 4. Irreducibly Shared Obligations
  • 5. Collective Obligations in Spite of Individual Incapability
  • 6. Remaining Problems of Collective Capability and Individual Incapability
  • References
  • Chapter 12: How Much Harm Does Each of Us Do?
  • 1. Sorts of Harm and Their Quantity
  • 2. New Data and Estimates
  • 3. Lives for Money
  • 4. The Consequences of Discounting
  • 5. Conclusion and Why It Matters.
  • 7. Feasibility Wedges and a Meta-Architecture for Global Agreement
  • References
  • Chapter 15: Pareto Improvements and Feasible Climate Solutions
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Concept of 'Political Feasibility'
  • 2.1 A Working Definition of 'Political Feasibility'
  • 2.2 Feasibility and Self-Interest
  • 3. International Paretianism and Climate Change
  • 3.1 Prospects for IP Climate Treaties
  • 3.1.1 Climate Change as a Coordination Game
  • 3.1.2 Climate Change as a Prisoners' Dilemma
  • 3.2 Does 'Self-Interest'Suffice?
  • 4. The Feasibility of IP Climate Deals
  • References
  • Chapter 16: Climate Change, Liberalism, and the Public/Private Distinction
  • 1. Climate Change and the Anthropocene
  • 2. Liberalism and the Public/Private Distinction
  • 3. The Distinction Under Pressure
  • 4. Pressure Drop?
  • 5. Concluding Remarks
  • References
  • Index.