Oxford studies in political philosophy. Volume 8

Oxford studies in political philosophy. Volume 8 / edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall.

This series aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in the vibrant field of political philosophy and its closely related subfields, including jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Sobel, David (Editor), Wall, Steven, 1967- (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2021.
Edition:First edition.
Subjects:
Political science > Philosophy.
Political science > Philosophy
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume 8
  • Copyright
  • Acknowledgments
  • Contents
  • List of Contributors
  • PART I: FAIRNESS AND COMPENSATION
  • 1: Grounding the Beneficiary Pays Principle
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. On the Beneficiary Pays Principle
  • (a) The BPP applies even if Beneficiary is morally innocent and does not seek out the benefits in question
  • (b) The BPP applies only to 'non-generative' benefits
  • (c) BPP applies not simply because Beneficiary possesses Victim's assets, but because Beneficiary benefits from doing so
  • (d) BPP applies even if Wrongdoer does not intentionally wrong Victim
  • (e) Beneficiary has an enforceable, directed duty to Victim
  • (f) BPP applies even if Wrongdoer has no intention to benefit Beneficiary
  • (g) BPP applies even if Beneficiary is not a cause of what Wrongdoer does
  • 3. BPP and the Service Principle of Compensation
  • 4. Challenges to the Service Principle of Compensation
  • 4.1. Overcompensation
  • 4.2. Overgeneralization
  • 4.2.1. Overgeneralization and Indirect Benefits Consider the following case.
  • 4.2.2. Overgeneralization and Socially Beneficial Vocations
  • 4.2.3. Overgeneralization and Unsolicited Benefits
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Works Cited
  • 2: Permissible Rights Infringements, Benefits, and Compensation
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Preliminaries and Two Desiderata
  • 3. The Beneficiary Pays Principle
  • 4. The Fairness Principle
  • 5. The Special Duty Principle
  • A. General Duties to Alleviate Harm as Weak Compensatory Duties
  • B. The Mere Receipt of Benefits Establishes a Special Relationship
  • C. Morally Tragic Involvement Increases the Stringency of the Duty to Alleviate Harm
  • D. Meeting the Two Desiderata
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • 3: Fair Insurance: Defended, Amended, and Extended
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Appeal of Fair Insurance.
  • 3. Fair Insurance within Limits
  • 4. The Reverse Transfers Objection
  • 5. Extending Fair Insurance
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • PART II: REPUBLICANISM
  • 4: Republicanism, Justice, and Equality of Opportunity
  • Introduction
  • 1. Republican Freedom, Republican Justice, and the Eyeball Test
  • 2. Equality of Opportunity and Non-Domination
  • 3. Against the Constitutive Argument
  • 4. Against the Causal Argument
  • 5. Accommodating Equality of Opportunity within Relational Theories
  • References
  • 5: Republican Liberty as Liberty within Rights
  • (1) Introduction
  • (2) Non-Domination
  • (3) Rights
  • (4) Republican Liberty Requires Rights
  • (5) Rights Contain Republican Liberty
  • (6) Objections and Replies
  • (7) Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • PART III: OTHER TOPICS
  • 6: Legal Toleration and Rights to Do Wrong
  • 1. The Structure of Legal Toleration
  • 1.1 From Moral to Legal Rights to Do Wrong
  • 1.2 A Proposal: Legal Toleration
  • 2. The Justification of Legal Toleration
  • 2.1 Integrity
  • 2.2 Uncertainty
  • 2.3 Disagreement
  • 2.3.1 Moral Ambivalence and Liberal Disagreement
  • 2.3.2 Democratic Conclusiveness and Rights to Do Wrong
  • 2.3.3 A Tolerant Egalitarian State?
  • Conclusion
  • 7: Incentives, Inequality, and Community Revisited
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. A Bargaining Model of Inequality
  • 3. The Shirking of All against All
  • 4. A Communal Model of Inequality
  • 5. Preserving Equality in the Face of Shirking?
  • 6. Choosing a Model
  • 7. Conclusion
  • References
  • 8: Pardons
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • A
  • B
  • C
  • 6
  • A
  • B
  • C
  • D
  • E
  • F
  • G
  • 7
  • 8
  • References
  • 9: Humanitarian Intervention, Other-Defense, and Consent
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Self- and Other-Defense
  • 3. Consent and the Ad Bellum Permissibility of Intervention
  • 3.1 The Normative Dominion Objection
  • 3.2 The Relevance of Consent.
  • 4. Consent and the Permissibility of Individual Acts of Humanitarian War
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Works Cited
  • Index.

Similar Items