Web and internet economics : 17th international conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021 : proceedings

Web and internet economics : 17th international conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021 : proceedings / Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen (eds.).

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19...

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Bibliographic Details
Corporate Author: Wine Conference Online
Other Authors: Feldman, Michal (Editor), Fu, Hu (Editor), Talgam-Cohen, Inbal (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cham : Springer, [2022]
Edition:1st ed. 2022.
Series:Lecture notes in computer science ; 13112.
LNCS sublibrary. Information systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI.
Subjects:
Internet > Economic aspects > Congresses.
Computer networks > Economic aspects > Congresses.
Electronic commerce > Congresses.
Game theory > Congresses.
Computer networks > Economic aspects
Electronic commerce
Game theory
Internet > Economic aspects
Electronic books.
proceedings (reports)
Conference papers and proceedings
Conference papers and proceedings.
Actes de congrès.
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Mechanism Design and Pricing
  • Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality
  • Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials
  • The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing
  • On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
  • Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss
  • Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances
  • Contract Design for A orestation Programs
  • Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching
  • Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
  • On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
  • Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction
  • Matching, Markets and Equilibria
  • Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model
  • Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis
  • The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home
  • Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods
  • Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem
  • Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy
  • The Platform Design Problem
  • A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria
  • Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations
  • Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations
  • Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem
  • Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias
  • Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment
  • Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies
  • Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary
  • The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice
  • Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries
  • Envy-free division of multi-layered cakes
  • Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies.

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