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|a 1343210587
|a 1372400576
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|a 9780192670335
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|a 0192670336
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|a 9780192670328
|q (electronic bk.)
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|a 0192670328
|q (electronic bk.)
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|a 9780191946905
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|a 0191946907
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|z 9780192856500
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|a (OCoLC)1341443871
|z (OCoLC)1343210587
|z (OCoLC)1372400576
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|a BJ1012
|b .S47 2022
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|a HCDD
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|a Sepielli, Andrew,
|e author.
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|a Pragmatist quietism :
|b a meta-ethical system /
|c Andrew Sepielli.
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|a First edition.
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|a Oxford :
|b Oxford University Press,
|c 2022.
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|c ©2022
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|a 1 online resource (240 pages)
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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|a Description based on online resource; title from home page (Oxford Academic, viewed on August 25, 2023).
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index.
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|a Cover -- Pragmatist Quietism: A Meta-Ethical System -- Copyright -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- 1: Introduction -- 1. An Outline of My View -- 2. A Chapter-by-Chapter Overview -- 2: Raw Materials -- 1. Deep and Superficial Inquiry and Debate -- 1. Explanation and Illustration -- 2. A Canonical Statement -- 3. Superficial/Deep vs Internal/External -- 2. The Special Features of Ethical Thought -- 3: Why Does There Seem to Be a 'Problem with Ethics'? -- 1. Why Seemingly Superficial Inquiry and Debate Seem Not to Be Objective -- 1. On 'Object-Placing' -- 2. On 'Cognition-Commanding'
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|a 2. Why the Foregoing Doesn't Generally Suggest a 'Problem' for Non-Ethical Domains -- 3. Why the Foregoing Does Suggest a 'Problem with Ethics' -- 4. Why Deep Ethical Debates Don't Seem to Save Ethical Objectivity -- 5. Superficial Ethical Debates, Revisited -- 6. Concerns about My Explanation: Philosophers and the Folk -- 4: Objectivist Quietism about Ethics, Part One: The Positive View -- 1. Why I'm Talking about Value Rather than Substantivity and Truth -- 2. The 'Truthy' Values -- 3. Why No Truthy Values Are at Stake in Superficial Ethical Debates -- 4. The 'Specifically Ethical' Values
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|a 5. How This Supports Quietism -- 6. Right Answers in Ethics -- 7. In Defence of Objectivist Quietism -- 1. Intuitions about Cases -- 2. Seeing Others in the Right Way -- 3. Epistemology -- 4. Evaluative Connections -- 5: Objectivist Quietism about Ethics, Part Two: Objections and Responses -- 1. What If Metaphysics, Semantics, Etc. Matter by Definition? -- 2. Why Assess Beliefs . . . in This Way? -- 3. Ethics in Deep Contexts -- 4. Divorcing Ethical Values from Truthy Values -- 5. Begging the Question -- 6: Pragmatism -- 1. Pragmatism What -- 1. Pragmatism vs Representationalism
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|a 2. Making Pragmatism Explanatory -- 2. Why Be a Pragmatist? -- 3. An Autonomous Evaluative Sphere? -- 7: Digging Deeper -- 1. Representationality, Right Answers, and the Importance of Explanation -- 2. What If I'm Wrong? -- 8: Moral Epistemology -- 1. Implications for Ethical Inquiry -- 1. Quietism and Foundationalism in Ethics -- 2. Meaning-Based Distortion -- 3. Metaphysical Arguments -- 4. Arguments from the Marks of Truth -- 5. Arguments from Rational Commitment -- 6. Indeterminate Anti-Quietist Arguments -- 7. Lessons for Moral Epistemology -- 2. Dealing with Disagreement
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|a 3. Debunking Arguments -- 1. Debunking Arguments and Explanation -- 2. How We Should Resist This Demand for Explanation -- 9: Pragmatist Quietism vs Expressivism -- 1. A Difference in Explanatory Framework -- 2. A Difference in Order of Inquiry -- 3. Both Differences Together: Meta-Semantics -- 10: Quietism and Counter-Normativity -- 1. The Counter-Reasons/Schmeasons Argument -- 2. The First Possibility: 'Reasons' and 'Schmeasons' Are Equally Thin, and Both Are Completely Thin -- 3. The Second Possibility: 'Reasons' Is Thinner than 'Schmeasons' Is
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|a 4. The Third Possibility: 'Reason' and 'Schmeason' Are Equally Thin, but Neither Is Completely Thin
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|a "Pragmatist Quietism argues that there are objective ethical truths that neither require nor admit of a vindication or foundation from domains outside of ethics--metaphysics, semantics, epistemology, and so on. First, it argues that normative-ethical debates are similar in important ways to debates that philosophers call 'merely verbal'; the key difference is that the former influence action and affect in a way that the latter do not. It then uses this set of features to explain why there are objective ethical truths that don't need or allow for extra-ethical vindication, but also why it can sometimes seem as though ethics is not objective. This explanation of ethical objectivity without foundations is a distinctly pragmatist one, where pragmatism is the approach to inquiry and explanation on which we endeavour to guide our beliefs by considerations of value rather than by the accurate representation of the world. The meta-ethical outlook is then applied to issues in moral epistemology, including disagreement, and debunking arguments"--Publisher's description.
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| 650 |
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|a Ethics.
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|a Pragmatism.
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|a ethics (philosophy)
|2 aat
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|a pragmatism.
|2 aat
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|a Ethics
|2 fast
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|a Pragmatism
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|i has work:
|a PRAGMATIST QUIETISM (Text)
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCY73pcG39qDcwCdMV96DRq
|4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork
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| 776 |
0 |
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|i Print version:
|a Sepielli, Andrew.
|t Pragmatist quietism.
|b First edition.
|d Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2022
|z 9780192856500
|w (OCoLC)1338685217
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| 856 |
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|u https://holycross.idm.oclc.org/login?auth=cas&url=https://academic.oup.com/book/44012
|y Click for online access
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|a OUP-SOEBA
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| 994 |
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|a 92
|b HCD
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