Leveraging latency : how the weak compel the strong with nuclear technology / Tristan A. Volpe.

"Leveraging Latency explores how the weak coerce the strong with nuclear technology. Allies and adversaries alike can compel concessions from superpowers by threatening to acquire atomic weapons. When does nuclear latency-the technical capacity to build the bomb-enable states to pursue this coe...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Volpe, Tristan A. (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023]
Series:Disruptive technology and international security.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access

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100 1 |a Volpe, Tristan A.,  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Leveraging latency :  |b how the weak compel the strong with nuclear technology /  |c Tristan A. Volpe. 
264 1 |a New York, NY :  |b Oxford University Press,  |c [2023] 
264 4 |c ©2023 
300 |a 1 online resource. 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a Disruptive technology and international security series 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
520 |a "Leveraging Latency explores how the weak coerce the strong with nuclear technology. Allies and adversaries alike can compel concessions from superpowers by threatening to acquire atomic weapons. When does nuclear latency-the technical capacity to build the bomb-enable states to pursue this coercive strategy? The conventional wisdom is that compellence with nuclear latency works when states are close to the bomb. But this intuitive notion is wrong. Tristan Volpe finds that more latency seldom translates into greater bargaining advantages. He reveals how coercion creates a tradeoff between making threats and assurances credible. States need just enough bomb-making capacity to threaten proliferation, but not so much that it becomes too difficult to promise nuclear restraint. The boundaries of this sweet spot align with the capacity to produce the fissile material at the heart of an atomic weapon. Historical studies of Japan, West Germany, North Korea, and Iran demonstrate that mere capacity to build atomic weapons can yield diplomatic dividends. As nuclear technology continues to cast a shadow over the global landscape, Leveraging Latency provides scholars and practitioners with a systematic assessment of its coercive utility. Volpe identifies a generalizable mechanism-the threat-assurance tradeoff-that explains why more power often makes compellence less likely to work. This framework illuminates how technology shapes broader bargaining dynamics and helps to refine policy options for inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons"--  |c Provided by publisher. 
505 0 |a Cover -- Half-Title -- Series page -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Theory of Compellence with Nuclear Latency -- 3. Japan -- 4. West Germany -- 5. North Korea -- 6. Iran -- 7. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index 
588 |a Description based on online resource; title from home page (Oxford Academic, viewed August 12, 2024). 
650 0 |a Nuclear nonproliferation  |x Political aspects. 
650 0 |a Nuclear weapons. 
650 0 |a Nuclear arms control. 
650 0 |a International relations. 
650 7 |a international relations.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a International relations  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Nuclear arms control  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Nuclear weapons  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Politics & government.  |2 thema 
650 7 |a Politics and Government.  |2 ukslc 
655 0 |a Electronic books. 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Volpe, Tristan A.  |t Leveraging latency  |d New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023]  |z 9780197669532  |w (DLC) 2022040749 
830 0 |a Disruptive technology and international security. 
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