| Summary: | "This chapter explains the four principal issues that are explored in this book. The four items on the Putative Contrasts List summarize these issues: (1) Both moral responsibility and moral obligation require freedom but whereas, seemingly, the former does not require freedom to do otherwise, the latter does. (2) Semicompatibilism regarding responsibility (or obligation) is the thesis that even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise, it is compatible with responsibility (or obligation). Arguably, while responsibility semicompatibilism is plausible, obligation semicompatibilism is far less tenable. (3) Externalism about responsibility or obligation is the view that how you acquire apt antecedents of action, such as beliefs, desires, and values, may influence whether you are responsible for, or are morally obligated to do, something. It appears that whereas responsibility externalism is true, there is little or no reason to believe that obligation externalism is true. (4) While obligations can change with time's passage, blameworthiness cannot. The general conclusion argued for is that the only item on this list that captures a real difference is item (3). Obligation and responsibility are far more similar to each other than items (1), (2), and (4) suggest. A chapter-by-chapter synopsis concludes the discussion"--
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