Strategic taxation : fiscal capacity and accountability in African states / Lucy Martin.

"Across the developing world, governments still lack the fiscal capacity to fund critical public goods, alleviate poverty, and invest in economic development. Yet, we know little about how to effectively build strong states in these settings. This book develops and tests a new theory to explain...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Martin, Lucy (Lucy Elizabeth Semple) (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023]
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Strategic Taxation: Fiscal Capacity and Accountability in African States
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1: Introduction
  • 1.1 What Makes Taxation Special?
  • 1.2 A New Theory of Taxation and Statement Development
  • 1.2.1 Empirical Approach
  • 1.3 Plan of the Book
  • 1.4 Implications
  • 2: Understanding Fiscal Capacity
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 The Old Story: Taxation and State-Building in Early Europe
  • 2.3 The Evolution of Modern Tax Systems in Europe
  • 2.4 Taxation in Africa
  • 2.4.1 Pre-colonial Taxation
  • 2.4.2 Taxation in Colonial Africa
  • 2.4.3 Taxation in Modern African States
  • 2.5 Comparing Europe and Africa
  • 2.5.1 The Nature of Survival Incentives
  • 2.5.2 Available Revenue Streams
  • 2.5.3 The Sequencing of Democracy and Development
  • 2.6 Conclusion
  • 3: How Taxation Increases Accountability Demands
  • 3.1 A Theory of Accountability
  • 3.2 How Do Citizens Set Thresholds?
  • 3.3 How Taxation Affects Willingness To Punish
  • 3.3.1 Taxation's Effect on the Punishment Threshold
  • 3.3.2 Taxation and Variation in the Propensity for Punishment
  • 3.4 Complicating the Model
  • 3.4.1 Tax Modality and Scope Conditions
  • 3.4.2 Model Extensions
  • 3.5 Alternative Mechanisms and Related Issues
  • 3.5.1 Is Loss Aversion Real?
  • 3.5.2 Increasing Action without Loss Aversion?
  • 3.5.3 Alternative Paths to Accountability
  • 3.6 Conclusion
  • Appendix
  • Appendix: A Model of Taxation and Punishment
  • Taxation's Effect on the Punishment Threshold
  • Taxation and Variation in the Propensity for Punishment
  • Taxation in a Repeated Game
  • Uncertain Punishment
  • Taxation and Collective Action
  • Pooling Equilibria
  • Separating Equilibria
  • Taxation's Effect Under Collective Action
  • 4: A Model of Taxation and Accountability
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Why Tax?.
  • 4.3 How to Tax?
  • 4.4 A Note for Readers
  • 4.5 Model without Elections
  • 4.5.1 Possible Fiscal Institutions
  • No Taxation
  • Coercive Taxation
  • Tax Bargaining
  • 4.5.2 Utility in Each Subgame
  • 4.5.3 No Taxation and Coercive Taxation
  • 4.5.4 Tax Bargaining
  • 4.5.5 Equilibria
  • 4.5.6 Discussion
  • 4.6 Adding Elections
  • 4.6.1 Defining the Citizen's Voting Decision
  • 4.6.2 No Taxation and Coercive Taxation with Elections
  • 4.6.3 Coercion vs. No Taxation
  • 4.6.4 Bargaining under Elections
  • 4.6.5 Equilibria of Model with Elections
  • 4.6.6 Understanding the Equilibria
  • 4.7 Discussion
  • 4.7.1 When Will Governments Support Taxation?
  • 4.7.2 Taxation's Effect on Rent-Seeking
  • 4.7.3 Bargaining and Coercion
  • 4.8 Extensions
  • 4.9 Conclusion
  • 5: Evidence that Taxation Increases Accountability Demands
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 An Experimental Approach
  • 5.2.1 Experimental Design
  • 5.2.2 Implementation
  • 5.3 Results: Tax and Grant Games
  • 5.3.1 Qualitative Evidence
  • 5.4 Testing the Mechanism
  • 5.4.1 Treatment Heterogeneity
  • 5.4.2 Loss Aversion or Fairness?
  • 5.4.3 Measuring Losses and Benefits
  • 5.4.4 Ownership and Loss Aversion: Complementary Mechanisms
  • 5.5 Replications
  • 5.6 The Role of Tax Modality
  • 5.7 External Validity and Scope Conditions
  • 5.7.1 Subgroup Analysis
  • 5.7.2 Making Punishment More Difficult
  • 5.7.3 Evidence from Outside the Lab
  • 5.8 Observational Data
  • 5.9 Conclusion
  • 6: Taxation, Democracy, and Accountability
  • 6.1 Democracy and Tax Revenues
  • 6.1.1 Summary Statistics
  • 6.1.2 Initial Regression Analysis
  • 6.1.3 Interaction Effects
  • 6.1.4 Democratization
  • 6.1.5 Robustness
  • 6.2 Democracy and the Tax Net
  • 6.2.1 Discussion
  • 6.3 Taxation, Accountability, and Rent-Seeking
  • 6.3.1 Robustness and Additional Work
  • 6.4 Conclusion
  • 7: Understanding Taxation in Uganda.
  • 7.1 Introduction
  • 7.2 Why Uganda?
  • 7.3 The Graduated Tax
  • 7.3.1 Low Electoral Accountability
  • 7.3.2 The Fate of the Graduated Tax under Political Competition
  • 7.4 Market Fees
  • 7.5 Taxing Boda-Bodas
  • 7.6 The Social Media Tax
  • 7.6.1 Analysis
  • 7.7 Indirect Taxation in Uganda
  • 7.7.1 Analysis
  • 7.8 Discussion
  • 8: Conclusion
  • 8.1 Scope Conditions
  • 8.1.1 Types of Taxes and Taxpayers
  • 8.1.2 Types of Governments
  • 8.2 Directions for Future Research
  • 8.2.1 Understanding Citizen Behavior
  • 8.2.2 Understanding Policy Outcomes
  • References
  • Index.