Oxford studies in political philosophy. Volume 10 / edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall.

This is the tenth volume of 'Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy'. Since its revival in the 1970s, political philosophy has been a vibrant field in philosophy, one that intersects with jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war th...

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Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Sobel, David (Editor), Wall, Steven, 1967- (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, [2024]
Series:Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Series.
Subjects:
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy
  • Copyright
  • Acknowledgements
  • Contents
  • List of Contributors
  • 1: Three Concepts of Legitimacy
  • References
  • 2: Legitimacy, Authority, and Democratic Duties of Explanation
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Explanation, AI, Power
  • III. Power, Legitimacy, Authority
  • IV. Legitimacy, Authority, Publicity
  • V. Publicity, Explanation, AI
  • VI. Objections
  • Are Explanations Necessary for Legitimacy and Authority?
  • Does AI Really Raise Questions of Legitimacy and Authority?
  • VII. Conclusion
  • 3: The Romantic Lie in the Brain: Collective Agency, Moral Responsibility, and the State
  • Section One: Collective Responsibility
  • Section Two: The Need for the State
  • Section Three: Uncovering the State
  • Section Four: Fleshing Out the State
  • Section Five: The Downfall of the Unitary Model
  • Section Six: Clarifications and Objections
  • Section Seven: Beyond State Agency
  • Section Eight: Conclusion
  • 4: Territorial Jurisdiction: A Functionalist Account
  • 1. Functionalism, Territory, and Ideal Takeovers
  • 2. The Unsuccessful States Objection
  • 3. The Natural Duty of Justice
  • 4. The Occupation Objection
  • 5. The Pro Tem Objection
  • 6. Conclusion
  • 5: Sequential Claims-Balancing, a Weak Limited Aggregationist Proposal
  • 1. Limited Aggregationism
  • 2. Preliminary Clarifications
  • 3. Weak vs. Strong Limited Aggregationism
  • 4. Why Weak Limited Aggregationism?
  • 5. Sequential Claims-Balancing
  • 6. Sequential Claims-Balancing and Challenge Cases
  • 7. Sequential Claims-Balancing vs. Other Limited Aggregationist Proposals
  • 8. Sequential Claims-Balancing and a Risk-Based Anti-Limited Aggregationist Argument
  • 9. Conclusion
  • References
  • 6: Proportionality and the Prospect of Compensation
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Internalism about Compensation
  • II.1 Double-Counting
  • II.2 Manipulating Lesser Evils
  • II.3 Ambiguities
  • III. Compensation and Compensability
  • III.1 Externalism about Compensation
  • III.2 Compensability
  • III.3 The Compensability Rule and Internalism Revisited
  • IV. Externalism, Compensability, and Proportionality
  • V. Conclusion
  • 7: Structures of Sufficiency
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Standard Sufficientarianism
  • III. The Dilemma
  • IV. First Horn: Agree with Direct Theory
  • V. Second Horn: Disagree with Direct Theory
  • VI. Three Alternative Theories
  • VII. Threshold Satiability
  • VIII. Metric Specificity
  • IX. Locating the Threshold
  • X. Conclusion
  • 8: Lotteries, Queues, and Bottlenecks
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Abundance, Scarcity, and Bottlenecks
  • 3. Scarcity and Lotteries
  • 4. Bottlenecks and Queues
  • 5. Complications
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • Index