Temporal experience : the atomist dynamic model

Temporal experience : the atomist dynamic model / Giuliano Torrengo.

Torrengo considers the core facts of temporal experience and their interconnections, ultimately defending the atomist dynamic model of temporal experience.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Torrengo, Giuliano (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]
Series:Oxford studies of time in language and thought.
Subjects:
Time > Philosophy.
Time perception.
Experience.
Philosophy: metaphysics & ontology.
Philosophy.
Online Access:Click for online access
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Series Page
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Acknowledgements
  • Contents
  • General Preface
  • Prologue
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 The ontology of the mental and the metaphysics of experience
  • 1.2 Cogent and interpretational phenomenology
  • 1.3 Experience-based claims
  • 1.4 Transparency and phenomenal objectivity
  • 1.5 Believing, experiencing, and projecting time
  • 1.6 Temporal experience: an overview of what follows
  • 2 Change and movement
  • 2.1 The experiences of change
  • 2.2 Pure and qualitative temporality
  • 2.3 Snapshot views
  • 2.4 Specious present views
  • 2.4.1 Atomistic specious present
  • 2.4.2 Molecular specious present
  • 2.5 Molecularism and postdictive illusions
  • 2.5.1 Holistic molecularism
  • 2.5.2 Contextualist molecularism
  • 2.6 Dynamic instantaneous contents
  • 2.6.1 The problem from analyticity
  • 2.6.2 Dynamic state features
  • 2.6.3 Persistence feelings
  • 2.7 Change and succession
  • 2.7.1 Discrete alteration
  • 2.7.2 Smooth alteration
  • 2.8 Conclusions
  • 3 The outer flow and the inner flow
  • 3.1 Awareness of succession
  • 3.1.1 Overarching phenomenology
  • 3.1.2 Real and virtual instants
  • 3.2 The continuity of experience
  • 3.2.1 The stream of consciousness
  • 3.2.2 Synchronic and diachronic gaps
  • 3.2.3 Experiential chunks
  • 3.3 The disunity of experience
  • 3.3.1 The anarchic flow
  • 3.3.2 The phenomenology of diachronic fullness
  • 3.3.3 Probing effects
  • 3.4 Presentational phenomenology and phenomenal objectivity
  • 3.4.1 The phenomenal time of the outer world
  • 3.4.2 The phenomenal time of the inner world
  • 3.5 Narrative cognition
  • 3.5.1 Narrative units
  • 3.5.2 Narrative thoughts
  • 3.6 Conclusions
  • 4 Presentness
  • 4.1 More than one present
  • 4.1.1 The indexical present
  • 4.1.2 The experiential present
  • 4.2 The phenomenal prominence of the present
  • 4.2.1 Presentness as perceptual content property
  • 4.2.2 Presentness as perceptual vehicle property
  • 4.2.3 Presentness as perceptual mode property
  • 4.2.4 Presentness eliminativism
  • 4.3 Presentness and phenomenal objectivity
  • 4.3.1 Space: structural and locational properties
  • 4.3.2 Time: lack of phenomenal discriminability
  • 4.4 From locational awareness to the narrative present
  • 4.4.1 Locational awareness
  • 4.4.2 Embodied and detached presentness
  • 4.5 Conclusions
  • 5 The passage of time
  • 5.1 Purported experience as of passage
  • 5.2 Representationalism
  • 5.2.1 Naive representationalism
  • 5.2.2 Rich content, complex content, and sophisticated representationalism
  • 5.3 Reductionisms
  • 5.3.1 Naive reductionism
  • 5.3.2 Sophisticated reductionism: succession and duration
  • 5.3.3 Sophisticated reductionism: distributionism
  • 5.4 Structuralisms
  • 5.4.1 Structural reductionism: pure update and perspectival shift views
  • 5.4.2 Structural primitivism: phenomenal modifier
  • 5.5 The belief that time passes
  • 5.5.1 Naive deflationism
  • 5.5.2 Sophisticated deflationism

Similar Items